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The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of the United States Marine 
Corps’ Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment 
decisions of first-term enlisted Marines.  This thesis will compare Marine retention 
probabilities under the lump sum payment program to the retention probabilities under 
the standard partial-annuity payment system. 
B. PROBLEM 
The All-Volunteer Force (AVF), initiated in 1973, has generated a number of 
operational and policy challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United 
States Marine Corps.  Not the least of these challenges has been the retention of quality 
first-term enlisted personnel.  The problem of retention of first-term personnel has been 
the subject of many studies sponsored by the DoD and the Marine Corps.  These studies 
reveal that certain factors consistently influence an individual’s decision to reenlist in the 
military.   
Civilian employment opportunity has been one consistently important predictor of 
retention.  The robust economy of the late 1990s, along with the low unemployment rates 
of that period, fueled the interest of young people to attain college degrees and seek 
employment in the private sector.  This state of affairs made retaining quality personnel 
extremely difficult as it created attractive and competitive civilian alternatives to a 
military career.  The perception among active-duty personnel that there are better 
opportunities, better pay, and a better quality of life in the private sector provided 
incentives for active duty personnel to depart from the military upon the expiration of 
their current contract. 
The strong state of the civilian employment situation has motivated military 
manpower planners to initiate policies that will stabilize the career force in the aggregate 
and eventually reduce the required first-term reenlistment rate.  In the meantime, planners 
must retain a targeted number of first-term Marines in order to meet the requirements of 
the overall total force structure.  Credible research has demonstrated an association 
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between the reenlistment propensity of quality Marines and higher monetary salaries and 
bonuses.  Therefore, planners have continued to depend upon the Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) as a tool to stimulate reenlistments.  
Marine Corps manpower planners use the Selective Reenlistment Bonus as a tool 
to manage and shape the career force.  The largest percentage of SRB funds are 
programmed for Zone A reenlistees.  Zone A is the decision point where a Marine is first 
eligible to be paid a reenlistment bonus.  This eligibility zone encompasses all enlisted 
Marines who are within 12 months of the end of their first contract (provided that they 
will have completed at least 17 months of continuous active duty, but not more than six 
years of active duty on the date of reenlistment).  Because of the military’s supply 
constraint that prevents lateral entry into the career force, the Zone A reenlistment point 
is critical for manpower planners.  Therefore, Zone A SRB payments are carefully 
modeled, managed, and implemented via official policy.  Additionally, substantial funds 
are obligated to support the reenlistment bonus program. 
Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 
percent of their SRB (in return for a minimum contract obligation of four years) on the 
date of reenlistment.  The remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the 
remaining reenlistment contract period.  In February 2000, the Marine Corps’ Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that lump sum SRBs would 
positively influence the reenlistment decisions of indecisive Zone A eligible Marines.  
[Ref 1:p. 72]  A Naval Postgraduate School Master’s thesis completed by Major Dave 
Ross, in March 2000, agreed with the General’s statement and stated further that net 
social benefits would be positive from a policy of paying bonuses in a lump sum.  [Ref 
1:p. 73]  Commencing in fiscal year 2001, Marines receive 100 percent of the SRB owed 
them upon reenlisting.  Zone A payment caps remained at $30,000. [Ref 2:p. 2] 
In May 2001, The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) received a request 
from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) asking for OSD’s opinion on 
nominating SRB for an “output measure” for the fiscal year 2003 President’s Budget.  As 
an “output” OMB intended to look at how successful the services have been in retaining 
those occupational fields receiving SRBs.  As an “outcome” they would look at the 
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impact on military readiness when critical specialties are fully manned.  The OSD request 
contributed to Marine Corps manpower planners’ interest in evaluating how effective the 
lump sum payment method of SRB is as an incentive to increase the propensity of 
enlisted Marines to reenlist.  [Ref 3] 
Furthermore, the need for empirical evidence demonstrating the effect of the SRB 
program on the Zone A eligible population’s propensity to reenlist came to the forefront 
immediately following the OMB request.  In October 2001, the Marine Corps initiated 
the Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (STAP).  STAP is a force-shaping tool that intends 
to align the career force more closely to manpower requirements.  STAP will invest 
heavily in the experience levels of career force Marines (those Marines with more than 72 
months of active duty time).  At the time of this writing (November 2001), manpower 
analysts noted that in order to support this initiative with SRB dollars, under the current 
SRB funding constraints, manpower planners will be required to decrease the dollar 
amount of bonuses offered to Zone A eligible Marines.  [Ref 5:p. 8]  Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of setting funding requirements in this effort to target reenlistments in the 
career force may be hampered by the absence of any analysis that captures the effect of 
the lump sum payment method of SRB upon reenlistment behavior. [Ref 4]      
Therefore, Marine Corps manpower planners have indicated that it is essential to 
determine the actual effect that the lump sum payment method has upon Marines’ 
propensity to reenlist.  However, it is essential to note several potential issues with 
determining the effect of the lump sum payment SRB program.  First of all, not everyone 
who was eligible and wanted to reenlist could reenlist in the SRB-targeted Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) for which they were eligible.  Secondly, the lump sum 
payment program commenced in October 2000 and this study will use data available 
through 30 September 2001.  As with most new programs, there will be a “honeymoon 
period” during which the program may demonstrate relatively unusual success prior to 
settling into a state of effectiveness where numerous tangible and intangible determinants 
may be controlled.  Subsequent analysis will be necessary in order to capture 
effectiveness a few years further into the program. [Ref 14:p. 314]  It should be noted, at 
the same time, the SRB program in fiscal year 2001 was shut down on 14 March 2001 
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due to budget limitations.  Manpower planners speculated that most Marines who would 
have been influenced by a SRB reenlisted during the last 30 days of the program.   
Finally, it is outside the scope of this research to control for the other military 
services.  In other words, other military branches, such as the Navy and Air Force have 
not yet initiated a lump sum SRB payment program, but are experiencing real 
improvements in their first-term reenlistment rates.  [Ref 7:p. 9 and Ref 8:p. 2]  The 
Marine Corps, in theory, is subject to the same retention influences as the other services.  
Therefore, the estimated marginal effect of the lump sum payment program on Marines 
may be much smaller or larger when compared to the other services. Finally, intangible 
factors such as the election of the new U. S. President, quality of life issues, and 
innumerable other world events may provide a surge of optimism amongst potential 
reenlistees. [Ref 9]  Limited time and data availability restrict the ability of this study to 
capture every possible determinant of reenlistment rates.  Although these challenges are 
essential to bear in mind, this research will endeavor to provide insight into the effect of 
the SRB lump sum payment method upon reenlistment behavior. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of the Marine Corps’ SRB program is to “assist in attaining and 
sustaining adequate numbers of career enlisted personnel in designated Military 
Occupational Specialties and within particular years-of-service groupings.” [Ref 10:p. 2]  
Since the SRB program is the “primary monetary incentive for inducing people to 
reenlist,” [Ref 11:p. 1] the Marine Corps has a vested interest in understanding the effect 
of changes in SRB policy on the propensity of enlisted Marines to reenlist.  This study 
researches Marine retention probabilities to better understand the effect of the lump sum 
payment program as an incentive to reenlist. 
There are several questions that this study attempts to answer regarding the effect 
of the lump sum payment program. 
• What was the change in first-term retention rates as a result of changing 
the Selective Reenlistment Bonus payment method to lump sum? 
• What is the impact of personal characteristics (e.g., age) on reenlistment 
decisions? 
• What is the impact of civilian pay and unemployment on reenlistment 
decisions? 
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• What is the impact of the SRB multiple under the installment and lump 
sum payment methods? 
This thesis will specify a bivariate logit model of enlisted retention in order to 
analyze the impact of the lump sum SRB payment method and selected personal and 
economic determinants on reenlistment probabilities. 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this thesis includes a literature review to identify the factors that, on 
average, have been found to influence the propensity of an enlisted Marine to reenlist.  
The effect of the SRB will be closely scrutinized during the literature review; a historical 
perspective of the SRB program and retention rates will be included.  An estimated 
model of enlisted retention will be developed and presented to evaluate the effect of SRB 
and the payment method.  This thesis will focus solely on Zone A Marines who were at 
their first reenlistment decision point and will not investigate SRB policy change impacts 
on Marines in Zone B or C. 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following steps: 1) a 
literature review of retention studies, books, periodicals, web-based articles, prior theses, 
and other library, military, and social science information resources; 2) interviews of 
personnel from Headquarters, Marine Corps, Code MPP-20, The Center for Naval 
Analyses, and other manpower experts; 3) collection and compilation of a data-base of all 
active-duty enlisted Marines who were at their first Zone A reenlistment decision point 
between fiscal years (FY) 1996 and 2001; 4) estimation of a model of enlisted Marine 
retention; 5) regression analysis and presentation of alternative specifications of the 
retention model in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the effect of SRB to an increasingly 
inclusive set of controls. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I.  Introduction. Explains the purpose and background of this thesis, 
outlines the research questions, and outlines the thesis structure. 
Chapter II.  Literature Review.  This chapter provides a review of prior retention 
and SRB studies.  The review is conducted in order to identify personal characteristics 
and economic determinants that have been found to have an impact upon enlisted 
persons’ reenlistment decisions.  
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Chapter III.  The Marine Corps' Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.  The 
third chapter provides an overview of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program in the 
Marine Corps, discusses historical SRB contract data, and reviews policy related to the 
SRB program.  Additionally, this chapter offers historical insight into the possible 
reasoning behind the Marine Corps’ decision to implement the lump sum payment plan 
for the SRB. 
Chapter IV.  Data and Model Development.  This chapter describes the data 
sources used for the models, data restrictions that were imposed, candidate explanatory 
variables, and the expected effects of the explanatory variables on the Zone A enlisted 
Marine’s reenlistment decision.  Additionally, this chapter discusses the construction of 
the civilian unemployment rate, and the military-to-civilian pay index variables.  Finally, 
this chapter provides descriptive statistics for Zone A reenlistments for fiscal years 1999 
through 2001. 
Chapter V.  Logit Model Results.  This chapter discusses analytical results for the 
effect of the lump sum SRB, personal characteristics, civilian unemployment rates, and 
the military-to-civilian pay index on reenlistment.  The results of estimating the bivariate 
model, described in Chapter IV, are presented and discussed. 
Chapter VI.  Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Research.  
This chapter summarizes the results of the bivariate model and analysis of data in regard 
to the Marine Corps’ Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.  Finally, 









II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW 
Social science research often bases model specification on a literature review of 
“what other researchers have done on that topic.” [Ref 38:pp. 655-656] Numerous studies 
addressing economic theory, military manpower research, methodological issues, and 
alternative techniques have identified a broad spectrum of pecuniary (e.g., bonuses) and 
non-pecuniary factors (e.g., gender) that influence reenlistment decisions (see [Ref 19] 
and [Ref 27]).  For example, the direction of relationships between bonuses and 
propensity to reenlist “has been well established both theoretically and empirically.  
Other things being equal, larger bonuses…are associated with higher reenlistment rates.” 
[Ref 16:p. 6]  Determining a suitable model specification and estimation technique can 
often be based on a review of previous research.  
Several studies have examined not only the effect of SRBs but also the method of 
payment.  Others have not studied method of payment, but have focused on monetary 
factors.  In a 1982 study, John Warner and Matthew Goldberg used a logit estimation to 
analyze the effect of reenlistment bonuses and regular military compensation on the 
probabilities of reenlistment and extension among first-term Navy enlisted personnel.  
Their paper was the first to explicitly study the three options that face a sailor at the end 
of his enlistment when a sailor may choose to: 1) reenlist; 2) extend his enlistment; or 3) 
leave the Navy.  Warner and Goldberg grouped all occupational ratings into nine 
occupational categories that they judged “to be similar in terms of skill requirements, 
tasks performed, and work environment.” [Ref 23:p. 2]  The hypothesis was that 
reenlistment rates are sensitive to military compensation, but that the relationship varies 
across occupational categories. 
Warner and Goldberg found that “pay elasticities vary substantially across 
occupational categories.” [Ref 23:p. i]  They found that under the lump sum SRB method 
a one-multiple SRB increase was related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2.0 to 3.9 
percentage points, depending on the occupational category.  When the civilian 
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unemployment rate was increased by one percentage point, the rate of reenlistment in any 
given occupational category also increased. 
Hosek and Peterson [Ref 17] developed logit model estimates for reenlistments, 
extensions, and retention with a sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force data between 
FY76 and FY81 in order to compare the effects of annualized versus lump sum SRB 
payment methods.  Each military occupational specialty (MOS) had its own intercept in 
order to control for the effects of unobserved factors (simultaneous equation bias).  These 
factors include the “unchanging aspects of work conditions in the MOS, promotion 
policy, reenlistment eligibility criteria, rotation policy and career development 
opportunities.” [Ref 19:p. 23]  A variable identifying the presence of a bonus was 
specifically designed to compare the effects of the 1979 change in SRB payment 
methods, from fiscal year 1976 through 1981.  
Hosek and Peterson defined retention as the decision to either reenlist or extend.  
They found: 1) that controlling for simultaneity bias was essential; 2) an increase in the 
military/civilian wage index increases both the reenlistment and retention rate; 3) higher 
bonuses can mitigate the effects of lower civilian unemployment; 4) reenlistment 
bonuses, whether lump sum or installment, are effective in increasing the reenlistment 
rate; and 5) at the first term reenlistment point, lump sum bonuses are more cost effective 
than installment bonuses in increasing expected man-years in an occupation.  
Furthermore, they noted that the added advantage of lump sum bonuses comes primarily 
from shifting personnel from extension to reenlistment; lump sum reenlistment bonuses 
are effective in increasing the reenlistment rate and decreasing the extension rate. [Ref 
17:p. 52]    
Donald Cymrot used a logit model with data from October 1979 through 
December 1985 to analyze the effects of SRB on Marine Corps retention.  He addressed 
the installment method of paying SRB by noting that spreading out SRB defers some 
payments into future fiscal years, while reducing current budgetary requirements.  
Additionally, annuity payments of SRB reduce the effectiveness of each dollar of SRB 
payments, assuming that Marines value a dollar today more than a dollar in the future. 
[Ref 22:p. 8]   
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Cymrot grouped Marine Corps military occupational specialties into 22 skill 
families (MOSs that require similar skills) arguing, “the magnitude of the effect is not 
likely to be the same in all jobs and in all occupations because circumstances and 
personnel vary.” [Ref 22:p. 2]  Like Hosek and Peterson, Cymrot defined retention as the 
decision to either reenlist or extend and used SRB, civilian and military pay, the 
unemployment rate, the suspension of SRB payments, and rank as independent variables.  
Mehay highlighted a key result of Cymrot’s study by noting that, “if the main purpose of 
a study is to examine the impact of the reenlistment bonus, then mixing the pay variables 
with the bonus variable will bias the effect of the bonus.”  A specification that uses a 
single relative pay measure is more consistent with economic theory. [Ref 27:p. 19]   
Cymrot used the logit model instead of the bivariate approach arguing that in the 
logit model: 1) increases in the bonus can either increase the retention rate or have no 
effect; 2) results can be adjusted for changes in other conditions; and 3) it is possible to 
predict outside the range of the observations. [Ref 22:p. 38]  Cymrot found that in nearly 
all of the skill families “the reenlistment rate increases with the bonus multiples, and in 
many cases the retention rate (which includes both reenlistments and extensions) also 
increases with bonus multiples.” [Ref 22:p. 60]  The only other factor that was found to 
have a significant impact upon the propensity to reenlist was rank. 
Cylke, Goldberg, Hogan, and Mairs presented estimates of the personal discount 
rate of young people making military career decisions resulting from a change in military 
compensation policy.  Prior to April 1979, reenlistment bonuses were paid in annual 
installments over the individual’s reenlistment period.  Beginning on 1 April 1979, the 
entire bonus was paid in lump sum at the date of reenlistment. [Ref 18:p. 1]   In 
comparing the effects of bonuses on the reenlistment rate in fiscal years 1978 and 1980, 
their study included interaction variables between the bonus multiple and fiscal year 
dummy variables.  The interaction variables were created to estimate the effects of 
bonuses on reenlistment rates separately under the two policy periods and the transition 
period.  That is, the interaction variables allowed the authors to test the hypothesis that 
the policy change in fiscal year 1979 led to an increase in the effect of bonuses. [Ref 
18:pp. 6-7]    
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Quester and Adedeji conducted a detailed examination of Marine Corps 
reenlistment decisions between FY80 and FY90.  The purpose of their study was to 
determine the impact of changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines “on 
reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted personnel and the ability of the Marine Corps 
to retain quality personnel with respect to selective reenlistment bonus, grade, and 
dependency status.” [Ref 16:p. v]  At the time of their study there was “little information 
regarding how these Marines respond to reenlistment decisions.” [Ref 16:p. 1]  
Their logit model used final decisions of “reenlist or didn’t reenlist” (no 
extensions), and restricted their data set to Marines within the first 72 months (Zone A) of 
active service.  Quester and Adedeji used the civilian unemployment rate in their model 
specification, and applied a pay index that reflects the changes in average levels of 
military to civilian pay.  They calculated elasticities from their logit model and 
determined that a one-percentage point increase in pay should lead to a 2.1 percentage 
point increase in the reenlistment rate.  The authors noted that, on average, a one-level 
increase in the SRB multiple raised the reenlistment probability by 6 percentage points. 
[Ref 27:p. 16]  Their results included the determination that the average impact of the 
SRB is greater for Marines who score higher on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, 
and, on average, marital and dependency status have a positive impact upon a Marine’s 
propensity to reenlist.  Other factors that were found to have a significant impact upon the 
propensity to reenlist were race, gender, and length of initial contract. 
North [Ref 28] chose a binary logit model (member reenlists or does not reenlist) 
to estimate the probability of Marine Zone A reenlistments.  He restricted his longitudinal 
data to Marines who were recommended and eligible for Zone A SRBs between October 
1986 and September 1992, which resulted in a sample of approximately 40,000 
observations.   
North’s results were similar to those of Quester and Adedeji, with the main 
exception of finding a smaller pay elasticity [Ref 27:p. 31].  Overall results indicated that 
higher SRB multiples, higher rates of civilian unemployment, and higher military-to-
civilian pay ratios are associated with higher reenlistment rates.   For example, North 
noted that a one-level increase in the SRB multiple raises the predicted reenlistment rate 
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by 7.1 percentage points, and a one percentage point increase in the military-to-civilian 
pay ratio results in a .2 percentage point increase in the reenlistment rate.  North 
discovered that most military occupational specialties have higher reenlistment 
probabilities relative to the military occupational specialty of Infantry.  Mehay points out 
that the Marine Corps uses the logit model in Quester and Adedeji and North to forecast 
the impact of changes in SRB multiples by one level on reenlistment rates (by MOS and 
zone). [Ref 27: p. 17]  
Michael Hansen applied a seldom-used methodology to estimate the relationship 
between compensation and retention.  Hansen’s estimate of military compensation 
involved a two-step approach focused on basic pay and the SRB.  After using personal 
characteristics of Navy enlisted personnel to predict civilian earnings on a rating-by-
rating basis, Hansen used the predicted earnings to estimate the retention relationship 
mentioned earlier.  Hansen’s approach was unique as earlier studies “typically calculate 
the average civilian earnings of veterans across all of the civilian occupations.  Using 
average earnings across occupations may introduce biases in measures of civilian 
opportunity costs not only because veterans are self-selected military leavers, but also 
because the civilian occupation they choose may be an outcome of this selection 
process.” [Ref 27:p. 17] 
Hansen’s civilian pay methodology matched 15 Navy ratings with comparable 
civilian occupations by using the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Occupational 
Conversion Index (DoD, 1993) as a bridge between the individual ratings and civilian 
occupations classified in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1991 through 1998.  
He estimated civilian earnings regressions that controlled for the demographic 
characteristics of education, gender, age, and race and used the estimates as part of a logit 
model that did not include the demographic characteristics, as they were used to predict 
civilian earnings.   
Hansen’s binomial logit model (dichotomous choice between “reenlisting” and 
“not reenlisting) results were generally consistent with the study completed by Quester 
and Adedeji although the pay effects were markedly different.  Specifically, Hansen 
noted significant, positive relationships between an enlisted member’s AFQT score, 
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length of initial contract, marital status, and sea-duty status with the member’s propensity 
to reenlist.  He also discovered a significant, positive relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the military-to-civilian pay ratio with the propensity to reenlist.  
Hansen’s estimate from a multinomial model revealed that a one-level SRB increase 
raised the reenlistment rate by about 3.4 percentage points.  Hansen addressed two 
notable conclusions to policy-makers when he stated that, 1) in recent years it appears 
that a larger change in compensation is needed to induce the same change in reenlistment; 
2) if policy-makers are interested in specifically targeting specific skills, it is important to 
realize that pay elasticities will vary from one rating to the next. [Ref 12:pp. 43-47]    
Ross (2000) evaluated personal discount rates for Marines, and used existing 
estimates of program effectiveness from current literature to determine the likely impact 
of switching from the partial installment method to the lump sum payment on Marine 
Corps enlisted retention in fiscal year 2000.  Mehay noted that prior studies have inferred 
personal discount rates for enlisted personnel that range from 17 percent to 37 percent.  
An individual whose personal discount rate is .10 would be indifferent between receiving 
$20,000 under the partial installment plan or receiving a lump sum payment today of 
$18,257 (assuming a 4-year reenlistment).  Another way to state this is that a $20,000 
bonus paid under the partial installment method has a present value of only $18,257 to 
the decision maker.  Shifting to the lump sum plan raises the present value to $20,000, an 
increase of $1,743 or about 10 percent.  If the personal discount rate were .20, the 
individual would be indifferent between $20,000 paid over time in partial installments 
versus a lump sum payment of $17,002, a difference of $2,980 or 15 percent.   
Using actual programmed SRB multiples by occupational field he calculated the 
value of the SRB multiple under the two payment schemes.  Ross estimated the lump sum 
plan would increase reenlistment rates by 6.8 percent if the personal discount rate = .21, 
9.4 percent if the personal discount rate = .31, and 11.65 percent if the personal discount 
rate = .41.    Ross’ estimations can be translated into terms applicable to this thesis.  That 
is, if the reenlistment rate in fiscal year 1999 was 22.6 percent, the lump sum plan would 
increase the reenlistment rate by 1.5 percentage points if the personal discount rate = .21, 
2.1 percentage points if the personal discount rate = .31, and by 2.6 percentage points if 
the personal discount rate = .41.  [Ref 27:pp. 25-26 and Ref 1:p. 51]  
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B. SUMMARY 
Analysts hypothesized that the relationship between SRBs and reenlistment rates 
will be positive and significant, and the literature has supported the argument that SRBs 
increase both the quantity and quality of reenlistments. [Ref 16:p. v]  Studies also have 
demonstrated that the lump sum SRB method is effective in increasing the reenlistment 
rate, and is more cost-effective than installment bonuses. Under the lump sum SRB 
payment method, a one-multiple SRB increase has been found to increase the 
reenlistment rate by 2.0 to 3.9 percentage points.  Several studies noted that a one-level 
increase in the SRB multiple raised the predicted reenlistment probability by 2.0 to 7.1 
percentage points.   
Prior research consistently applied the logit model in evaluating the impact of 
explanatory variables upon reenlistment.  Binary logit results often were converted to 
elasticities in order to more accurately communicate the relationship between a change in 
an explanatory variable and the reenlistment outcome.  Significant explanatory variables 
fell into three broad categories: 1) economic variables (e.g., unemployment rate, bonuses, 
and military pay); 2) personal characteristics (e.g., gender, grade, and race); and 3) 
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III. THE MARINE CORPS' SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT 
BONUS PROGRAM 
A. HISTORY OF THE SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT PROGRAM 
“Basic pay is the largest component of military compensation.  The most 
significant way in which compensation varies across ratings [equivalent to Marine Corps 
Military Occupational Specialties] is through the payment of selective reenlistment 
bonuses.”  [Ref 12:p. 37]  Marine Corps manpower planners to “maintain an adequate 
level of experienced and qualified enlisted personnel in the peacetime forces of the 
uniformed services” use selective reenlistment bonus payments as a tool.  [Ref 13:p. 395]   
Although the SRB program is expensive, costing the Marine Corps upwards of 
$40 million in fiscal year 2001, “it can cost less than recruiting and training new 
personnel or encouraging retention through other alternatives, such as across-the-board 
pay raises.” [Ref 11: Introduction]  Furthermore, studies consistently demonstrate that 
“the SRB program has proven to be the most efficient and cost-effective way to attain 
required retention rates in critical skills.” [Ref 15:p. 21]  Analysts at the Center for Naval 
Analyses point out that “SRBs increase both the quantity and the quality of Marine Corps 
reenlistments.” [Ref 16:p. v]  Additionally, the RAND Corporation concludes that 
reenlistment bonuses are “a potent, versatile component of military compensation.  
Bonuses may be turned on or off rapidly and targeted on critical skills.  They not only 
increase the retention rate but induce personnel to reenlist rather than extend, thereby 
increasing expected man-years.” [Ref 17:p. vii]       
The source of the present SRB authority is the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel 
Bonus Revision Act of 1974. [Ref 13:p. 399]  Prior to April 1979, the SRB was paid in 
annual installments with the maximum amount payable not to exceed $15,000. [Ref 18:p. 
1]  Starting on 1 April 1979, Congress allowed “payment of the entire amount of bonus at 
the beginning of a new reenlistment or extension of an existing enlistment.  In 1982, this 
was changed so that 50 percent of the bonus could be paid as a lump sum and the 
remainder paid in equal annual installments.” [Ref 19:p. 2]   
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In 1985, Congress adjusted the program requiring that “at least 75 percent of the 
bonus payable for reenlistment be paid in a lump sum at the beginning of the period for 
which the bonus is paid, with any remaining amount paid in equal annual installments.” 
[Ref 19:p. 402]  The 75 percent clause was amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 “to provide that the initial installment 
could not be less than 50 percent.” [Ref 19:p. 402]  The rationale for the restriction is a 
familiar one.  As explained by the House Armed Services Committee: “current fiscal 
realities continue to make such bonus payments infeasible.  Accordingly, the committee 
recommends prohibiting the payment of more than 50 percent up-front lump sum 
reenlistment bonus during fiscal years 1988 and 1989.” [Ref 19:pp. 402-403] 
In March 2000, Major Dave Ross (Marine Corps SRB program manager) noted 
“SRBs are authorized in section 4.3.3.1 of the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 
1304.21 to be paid using a lump sum payment method.” [Ref 1:p. 4]  At the same time, 
section 8021 of the Fiscal Year 2001 Budget states that, “notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to pay 
more than 50 per centum of an amount paid to any person under section 308 of title 37, 
United States Code, in a lump sum.”  However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), working with congressional appropriators during fiscal year 2001, successfully 
repealed the National Defense Authorization Act provision that restricted the up-front 
payment of bonuses to 50 percent. [Ref 29]  Subsequently, Headquarters Marine Corps 
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) announced a policy change to the payment method of 
the SRB.  According to Marine Administrative Message 436/00: 
In FY01, Marines will receive 100 percent of their reenlistment bonus in 
one lump sum payment.  Marines will now be able to receive the full 
payment of the SRB owed them upon reenlisting.  Previously, Marines 
received 50 percent of their SRB payment amount upon reenlistment with 
the remaining 50 percent being paid in equal installments over the 
following three years.  All Marines will be required to receive payment of 
their SRB using the lump sum payment method.  Zone A payment caps 
remain at $30,000 in FY01.  [Ref 2:p. 2] 
B. REENLISTMENT POLICY 
Approximately 80% of all new Marine Corps enlistees sign initial contracts 
obligating them to four years of active service.  [Ref 6]  Subsequent contracts vary in 
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length of obligation.  When a contract obligation is completed a Marine must “choose to 
extend or reenlist for a specified period, leave active service and join the reserves, or 
leave the military entirely.” [Ref 20:p. 50]   
Marines in certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) may be paid a 
reenlistment bonus if they fall into one of three opportunity zones upon being eligible and 
recommended for reenlistment.  A Marine with between 17 months and 6 years of 
continuous service who is eligible and recommended to execute a reenlistment is in SRB 
Zone A.  A Marine with between 6 and 10 years of continuous service who is eligible and 
recommended to execute a reenlistment is in SRB Zone B.  A Marine with between 10 
and 14 years of continuous service who is eligible to execute a reenlistment is in SRB 
Zone C.   
In order to receive an SRB, a Marine must: 1) be within 12 months of their 
Expiration of Active Service (EAS); 2) be eligible and recommended for reenlistment; 3) 
be serving in the grade of lance corporal or above; 4) reenlist for a minimum period of 
four years in the Regular Marine Corps within three months after the date of discharge or 
release from active duty; and 5) be assigned a primary MOS or possess a skill associated 
with an additional MOS which is SRB-eligible.  Furthermore, a Marine can only receive 
one SRB (which is capped at $30,000 for Zone A payments) in each opportunity zone. 
[Refs 2 and 10]  Although SRB is offered to Marines in three different zones, “the most 
critical reenlistment point for the Marine Corps career force planners is the Zone A 
reenlistment point.” [Ref 1:p. 5] 
Bonus payments are based on multiples of the Marine’s monthly basic pay 
multiplied by years of additional obligated service.  For example, an eligible and 
recommended Corporal (E4) disbursing clerk (MOS 3432) with four years active service 
during calendar year 2001 would have received a lump sum SRB of  $6,304 upon 
reenlistment (four year obligation, multiplied by $1576.20 base pay, multiplied by a 1 
SRB multiple).  Multiples are normally in the range of zero to five, although they are 
authorized by MCO 7220.24M not to exceed 10.  Internal Marine Corps policy limits the 
maximum multiple to 5. [Ref 6]  The proposed SRB multiples are generated for specific 
Military Occupational Specialties (307 separate MOSs, which are aggregated into 38 
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occupational fields, were utilized by the Marine Corps from fiscal year 1996 through 
fiscal year 2001).  All MOSs are assigned an SRB multiple ranging from zero to five.  
Reference 1 provides a detailed synopsis of the entire SRB multiple process.  Zone A 
reenlistment rate estimates are provided by the Center for Naval Analyses for each of the 
Marine Corps’ 38 occupational fields listed in Table 1.        
 
Occupational Field Occupational Field Description 
01 Personnel and Administration 
  02 Intelligence 
03 Infantry 
04 Logistics 
05 Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Plans 
06 Command and Control Systems 
08 Field Artillery 
11 Utilities 
13 Engineer, Construction, Facilities and Equipment 
18 Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle 
21 Ordnance 
23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
25 Operational Communications 
26 Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare 
28 Ground Electronics Maintenance 
30 Supply Administration and Operations 
31 Traffic Management 
33 Food Service 
34 Financial Management 
35 Motor Transport 
40 Data Systems 
41 Marine Corps Exchange 
43 Public Affairs 
44 Legal Services 
46 Visual Information 
55 Music 
57 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
58 Military Police and Corrections 
59 Electronics Maintenance 
60/61/62 Aircraft Maintenance 
63/64 Avionics 
65 Aviation Ordnance 
66 Aviation Logistics 
68 Meteorological and Oceanographic Services 
70 Airfield Services 
72 Air Control/Support/Antiair Warfare/Air Traffic 
73 Navigation Officer/Enlisted Flight Crews 
9919 Reporting MOSs 
 
Table 1.   Occupational Field Codes and Descriptions. 
Source: [Ref 21:p. 3-TOC-1] 
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Headquarters Marine Corps (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) utilizes the 
estimates “as a basis for setting up its First-Term Alignment Plan (FTAP).” [Ref 1:p. 39]  
The FTAP process was established to prevent promotion stagnation, and over-staffing 
(which can be caused by reenlisting too many Marines in each MOS).  The FTAP 
determines how many enlisted personnel the Marine Corps will need to bring into the 
career force. [Ref 1:p. 39]  Career force is defined here as those Marines who have 
reenlisted for a space that was required, by the FTAP, to be filled.  The Zone A SRB 
program supports the execution of the FTAP.  Because of the importance placed on the 
FTAP by the Marine Corps, Zone A reenlistments are restricted to only Marines who are 
reaching their End of Active Service (EAS) during the FTAP fiscal year.  In other words, 
a Marine with an EAS of October 5th will only have five days to reenlist.  In the same 
way, a Marine with an EAS of 1 July 2002 can reenlist on 1 October 2001.  [Ref 6]      
C. PAYMENT METHOD AND RESULTS 
As the Marine Corps has already made the decision to utilize the SRB lump sum 
payment method, it is beyond the scope of this research to discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of switching to a lump sum SRB payment method.  Ross (2000), 
Government Accounting Office (1985), Goldberg and Warner (1982), Cymrot (1987), 
and Hosek and Peterson (1985) provide detailed synopses of the quantitative and 
qualitative costs and benefits associated with the SRB installment and lump sum payment 
methods.    
Essentially, analysts argue that paying the SRB in a lump sum payment is: 1) 
more cost-efficient than the installment method on a dollar-for-dollar basis; 2) more 
readily visible to congressional and DoD decision-makers; and 3) less limiting to 
congressional and DoD decision-makers when they have to reduce the SRB budget for 
purely fiscal reasons. [Ref 11:pp. 7-10]  At the same time, the method of paying the SRB 
as a lump sum payment may: 1) reduce the incentive for reenlistees to complete their 
initial contract; 2) make the bonus less visible to the service member over the entire 
length of the contract period; 3) increase the risk of financial loss if members do not 
complete their reenlistment contracts; and 4) temporarily (until prior year installment 
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payments are fully paid out) increase the current SRB budget in order to cover the new 
payment method. [Ref 1:pp. 33-34, Ref 11:p. 9, and Ref 6] 
The initial response by enlisted Marines to the fiscal year 2001 introduction of the 
lump sum SRB payment method was overwhelmingly positive.  An “unprecedented 
number of first-term Marines leapt at the chance to take all their reenlistment cash up 
front, leaving manpower planners confident that the Marine Corps would easily meet its 
goal to retain 6,144 first-term Marines this year.” [Ref 6 and Ref 24]  Table 2 compares 
the number of Zone A SRB “takers” in fiscal year 2001 with “takers” in fiscal year 2000.  
While Table 3 outlines the SRB “take rate” as a percentage of the first-term population at 
EAS, note that the event of “taking the SRB” is constrained by the number of Marines 
and occupations that are offered an SRB. 
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the lump sum SRB payment method is 
associated with an increase in confirmed Zone A contracts as a percentage of the EAS 
population and targeted number of FTAP spaces.  For example, Table 2 displays that 
there were 585 more SRB contracts just in the first two quarters of fiscal year 2001 than 
in all of fiscal year 2000.  Furthermore, the 7.8 percentage point increase in Zone A 
contracts signed (as a percentage of FTAP targeted number of reenlistments) in fiscal 
year 2001 as compared to fiscal year 2000 is a full three percentage point increase over 
the next highest percentage change (between fiscal years 1997-1998 and fiscal years 
1998-1999).   
                      
Period FY 01 SRB “Takers” FY 00 SRB “Takers” 
   
October 1248 506 
November 493 660 
December 404 287 
January 316 159 
February 204 137 
March 279 233 
Subtotal 2944 1982 
   
Quarters 3 and 4 44 377 
   
Total 2988 2359 
 
Table 2.   Comparison of Number of SRB ‘Takers.’ Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. 
Source: [Ref 4] 
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Table 3 shows that the contract rate in 2001, 13 percent, is considerably higher 
than the contract rate in previous fiscal years.  For example, the average (unweighted) 
contract rate for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 is 9.65.  Thus, the rate in 2001 is 3.35 points 
higher, which is a difference of nearly 30 percent. 
 
Fiscal Year EAS Population FTAP 
Reenlistment 
Target 
Zone A SRB 
Contracts 
SRB Contracts as 
% of EAS 
Population 
     
1996 22,072 4,296 961 4.4 
1997 24,000 4,600 1,250 5.2 
1998 21,824 4,634 1,513 6.9 
1999 23,832 5,472 2,077 8.7 
2000 22,294 5,787 2,359 10.6 
2001 23,051 6,144 2,988 13.0 
 
Table 3.   SRB 'Take Rate' as a Percentage of First-Term EAS Population and FTAP 
Reenlistment 'Target'. 
Source: [Ref 4] 
 
On July 18, 2001, Marine Lieutenant General Garry Parks (Deputy Commandant 
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) stated: “In fiscal year 2001 we successfully initiated 
lump sum bonus payments increasing the net present value of the incentive and positively 
influencing highly qualified, yet previously undecided personnel.” [Ref 25:p. 3]  The 
numbers displayed in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the lump sum SRB program has 
significantly aided the Marine Corps’ first-term reenlistment and retention situation.  
There is, however, the inherent risk of drawing a hasty conclusion as to the actual 
influence that the lump sum SRB program had upon the propensity of a first-term Marine 
to reenlist.  Babbie states that: “Whenever it seems to you that X caused Y, ask yourself 
if that is necessarily the case.  What else could have caused Y?” [Ref 26:p. 79]  This 
concern was summarized by the current Marine Corps’ SRB planner (Major Dave Ross) 
to the author.  That is, “if there’s a need to justify or show the effects of the SRB, 
regression analysis is the way to go.  There are too many other factors that influence the 
reenlistment decision, and to base “readiness” purely on the SRB would be a mistake.” 
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IV. DATA AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the specification of the reenlistment model, describes the 
data sources and restrictions used for the model, describes the candidate explanatory 
variables, and discusses the expected effects of the explanatory variables on the 
reenlistment decision of Zone A Marines.  The chapter discusses the construction of the 
civilian unemployment rate variable and the military-to-civilian pay ratio variable.  The 
chapter details the data utilized in the model.  The model estimates the impact of the 
lump sum SRB payment method, selected personal demographic characteristics, and 
economic determinants on the reenlistment decisions for Zone A Marines making 
reenlistment decisions.  The analysis will determine the probability that a first-term 
enlisted member will reenlist in the Marine Corps based on the selected personal 
characteristics, economic factors, and SRB payment method. 
Two major sources of data were used to evaluate the relationship between the 
selected variables and enlisted Marine reenlistment decisions.  The first major source of 
data was provided by Headquarters, Marine Corps (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and 
taken from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) for fiscal years 1996 through 2001.  
From the TFDW, data files were created that contained characteristic and transaction data 
on each Zone A Marine who was within 12 months of their ECC on 1 October of 
calendar years 1998, 1999, and 2000.  Each Marine’s final reenlistment status was 
flagged on 30 September of years 1999, 2000, and 2001 in order to constrain the decision 
window to each Marine’s first year of reenlistment eligibility.  The constrained data set 
consisted of all Zone A Marine enlisted personnel who made a reenlistment decision 
between 1 October 1998 and 30 September 2001.  SRB multiples greater than zero were 
offered on 1 October of fiscal years 1996 through 2001 to Marines in 240 of the 307 
MOSs used by the Marine Corps during this time period.  For the purpose of this study, 
each of the 307 MOSs was categorized into one of thirteen Skill Families for model 
comparison purposes.   
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The second major source of data, the March Current Population Survey (CPS), 
was provided by Dr. Michael Hansen (Center for Naval Analyses) and “is used to provide 
information on civilian earnings opportunities.” [Ref 12:p. 33]  The primary goal of the 
Current Population Survey is: 
the development of statistical data about the civilian labor force.  In 
addition it collects information about each member of the interviewed 
household, as well as labor-related data for the population aged 15 or over.  
The Bureau of Census conducts a monthly survey that captures 
information such as age, race, sex, employment status, family 
characteristics and marital status.  Every year a March survey focuses on 
one of thirteen standard topics.  It is called the demographic supplement.  
The March supplement captures elements such as hours and weeks worked 
and money income received in the previous calendar year; and the use of 
social programs. [Ref 20:pp. 93-94] 
A binary logit estimating model was used because the reenlistment decision is a 
binary outcome.  In the logit model the contribution of each independent variable to the 
reenlistment decision can be measured as a marginal effect (the change in probability of 
reenlistment given a 1-unit change in the independent variable) of each variable upon the 
dependent variable.  Furthermore, the calculated pay elasticity of reenlistment can be 
used to determine the percentage change in reenlistment associated with a 1-percent 
change in the military-to-civilian pay ratio.  These results can be used to evaluate and 
compare the relative effects of a variety of personal characteristics and economic 
determinants, including the unemployment rate, military and civilian pay, and the SRB 
program.   
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The focus of this analysis will be on active-duty Zone A enlisted Marines who are 
at their first reenlistment decision point during fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  This 
approach is somewhat dissimilar to previous studies that have only used data on 
individuals who are eligible to reenlist.  Data and time limitations precluded this study 
from eliminating Marines from the data who may not have been eligible for reenlistment 
due to various physical or administrative reasons.  Therefore, if person does not reenlist it 
is impossible to discern whether or not they were administratively eligible to reenlist in 
the first place.  However, if a person actually reenlists, it is safe to assume that the Marine 
was eligible to reenlist.     
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Hansen pointed out:  “there is no clear consensus on the appropriate measure of 
‘reenlistment’ or ‘retention’ in the empirical literature.” [Ref 12:p. 33]  A Marine who is 
at his reenlistment decision point may leave the Marine Corps, sign a reenlistment 
contract, or extend his contract.  For the purpose of this study, reenlistment, not 
extension, will be the focus of the analysis; Zone A Marines who remained in the Marine 
Corps beyond the end of their current contract (ECC) without signing a reenlistment 
contract were eliminated from the primary data file. While the analysis of reenlistment, 
not extension, is the primary purpose of this study, a secondary data set was developed to 
analyze the impact of the lump sum payment method on the reenlistment decisions of 
Marines who stayed beyond their ECC (‘stayers’).  Zone A Marines who left the Marine 
Corps at the end of their current contract were eliminated from the second data file.  In 
estimating the model ‘reenlistment rate’ is defined as the ratio of all Zone A Marines who 
actually reenlisted to all Zone A Marines who are at their first reenlistment decision 
point.  Likewise, ‘reenlist to stayer rate’ is defined as the ratio of all Zone A Marines who 
reenlisted to all Marines who remained beyond their original ECC.  
For the purposes of this study, ECC date is used as a delimiting point rather than 
the expiration of active service (EAS) date primarily because of the practical application 
of manpower policy outlined in the Marine Corps Total Force System Personnel 
Reporting Instructions Manual (MCTFSPRIM).  First, the language of Section 30305.1, 
MCTFSPRIM suggests that the ECC may be administratively maintained with greater 
administrative scrutiny than the EAS because the ECC has a direct impact on a Marine’s 
pay.  Section 30305.1 states that, “an expired ECC will suspend computation of leave, 
pay, allowances, and terminate payment of allotments.  ECC logic will automatically stop 
direct deposit two paydays before the ECC date for first-term Marines.”  Furthermore, 
“voluntary extensions of enlistment will adjust the ECC only after the extension is 
effected.”  Second, focus on the EAS may fail to accurately reflect a reenlistment 
delimiting point for deployed Marines who are eligible for the SRB.  Section 30308.1 of 
the MCTFSPRIM states, “when the EAS date expires while a Marine is serving on a 
naval vessel in foreign waters, the Marine may be retained beyond normal EAS for 
Convenience of the Government until the vessel returns to the continental United States 
(CONUS).” [Ref 31]   
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Although several variables that affect the reenlistment decision were identified in 
the literature review outlined in Chapter II, studies noted the consistent impact of the 
economic determinants of relative pay, unemployment, and bonuses upon the propensity 
of enlisted members to reenlist.  Therefore, the strategy of this study depends on the 
development of reliable estimates of military and civilian pay, and civilian 
unemployment rates.   
C. UNEMPLOYMENT DATA  
Similar to the strategy used by Hansen, this study uses “state-specific, monthly 
unemployment rates, where the unemployment rate is that of the state in which the person 
was residing when first enlisting (defined as a Marine's home-of-record)” in order to 
“control for economic conditions at the time of the reenlistment decision.” [Ref 12:p. 38]  
Non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rate figures provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics were averaged over twelve months for fiscal years 1999 through 2000, and over 
seven months for fiscal year 2001.  “To the extent that people are considering job 
opportunities ‘back home’ when making a reenlistment decision (a reasonable 
assumption for those in Zone A), these local unemployment rates reflect the economic 
environment in which a person is operating at the time of reenlistment.” [Ref 12:p. 38]  
The range of state-specific unemployment rates during fiscal years 1999 through 2001 
was from 2.0 to 6.9 percent (see Appendix A).     
D. MILITARY-TO-CIVILIAN PAY RATIO AND BONUS MULTIPLES 
DATA  
Research outlined in Chapter II highlights the importance of estimating the impact 
of bonuses upon the reenlistment decision by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  In 
this analysis, all SRB and compensation information is based on the Marine’s Primary 
Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS).  For the purposes of this study all PMOSs were 
grouped into 13 Skill Families that had clear civilian counterparts.  An occupation-
specific relative pay ratio was constructed for each Marine by using the annual earnings 
for the comparable civilian occupations as the denominator, and an individual’s base pay 
(on 1 October of the fiscal year of his first opportunity to reenlist) as the numerator.  Each 
Marine’s base pay was a function of his rank and years of service (see Appendix B).   
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The creation of the Skill Families is based loosely on Eitelberg’s (1988) 
categories of MOS classification composites.  The Marine Corps classification 
composites outlined by Eitelberg are: 1) Combat; 2) Field Artillery; 3) Clerical; 4) 
Electronics Repair; 5) Mechanical Maintenance; and 6) General Technical.  The 
fundamental principle of grouping PMOSs by similar skills is treated in a Defense 
Manpower Commission report: 
Eligibility for assignment to jobs involving, for instance, mechanical 
work, was determined by the score a person achieved on a test purportedly 
predictive of mechanical aptitude.  Thus the qualification of individuals 
for assignments to all occupations in which mechanical work 
predominated was governed by the score attained on the mechanical 
aptitude test.  Similarly, other occupations characterized by another 
common and essential type of work such as clerical activities, were 
grouped together in occupational “clusters” corresponding to the common 
aptitude required.  This practice continues today, although the various 
aptitude tests have been periodically refined over the years. [Ref 30:p. 69] 
Data availability allowed the creation of 13 Skill Families in order to allow for 
more variability and realism than is offered by the six classification composites 
mentioned by Eitelberg.  At the same time, the number of Skill Families was constrained 
to 13 to ensure that each Skill Family had at least 50 to 100 separate civilian income 
observations per year from the Current Population Survey (CPS). [Ref 32] 
The multi-part procedure that created the relative pay next created the civilian 
opportunity pay for each Marine Skill Family.  This is based on the CPS data of 
estimated earnings available to a civilian worker in a comparable civilian occupation to 
the Marine’s PMOS.  The Marine's PMOS and its comparable civilian counterpart were 
linked via the 1997 Department of Defense Occupational Conversion Index (OCI) and 
the March Current Population Survey.  First, in a manner that considered Eitelberg's 
classification code guidance, each PMOS was placed into a Skill Family. [Ref 30:pp. 
230-240 and Ref 32]  Then, each PMOS was matched as closely as possible with a 
comparable civilian occupation title from the OCI. [Ref 33]  Hansen referenced the 
difficulty in matching each PMOS with a comparable civilian occupation title when he 
noted: "some ratings have clear civilian counterparts, but many do not." Furthermore, 
"although the OCI matches many ratings (MOSs) to a unique civilian counterpart, some 
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ratings are matched with more than one civilian occupation." [Ref 12:p. 15]  In turn, each 
comparable civilian occupation title from the OCI was assigned a range of CPS codes.  
Table 4 details the classification coding for each Skill Family and the CPS codes for the 
comparable civilian counterpart occupation classifications assigned to each Skill Family.  
Appendix D lists the comparable civilian counterpart occupations by their CPS codes.  
Appendix C details the assignment of each PMOS into a specific Skill Family and 
exhibits the multiples offered to each PMOS during each fiscal year evaluated by this 
study.   
SKILL FAMILY (Skill Family Code) CPS Code SKILL FAMILY (Skill Family Code) CPS Code
Aircraft Maintenance (ACM) General Technical (GT)
Aircraft Maintenance 503-549 Signals Intel/Electronic Warfare 226-235
Auditing, Finance and Accounting 337-344
Band (BA) 183-198 Data Systems 226-235
Public Affairs 183-198
Clerical (CL) Training and Audio Visual Support 183-198
Weather Service 223-235
Operational Communcations 344-387 Printing and Reproduction 734-737
Auditing, Finance and Accounting 325-344 Flight Crew/Loadmaster 875-883
Supply Administration and Ops 359-374 Computer Equipment Operators 308-319
Personnel and Administration 325-344 College Degree Enlisted 113-154
Legal Services 226-235
Training and Audiovisual Support 377-389 Food Service (FOOD)
Aircraft Maintenance 377-389
Airfield Services 303-309 Food Service 433-444
Clerk 377-389
Transportation 359-374 MP/NBC/EOD/Ammo (MP)
Exchange 263-278
Ammunition, EOD and MP 416-427
Combat (CO) 416-427 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 416-427
Electronics Repair (EL) Mechanical Maintenance (MM)
Electronics/Data/Comm Maintenance 523-534 Utilities 534-549
Avionics 505-549 Ordnance 634-655
Utilities 505-549 Engineer, Construction, Equip 703-715
Operational Communications 344-353 Airfield Services 843-859
Field Artillery (FA) Motor Transport (MT)
Field Artillery 213-235 Motor Transport 505-517
Tank/Amphibian Tractor 843-859
Anti-Air Warfare 213-235
Enlisted Navigator/Air Traffic Control (NAV) Logistics (LOG)
Enlisted Navigator 226-235 Logistics 868-883
Air Traffic Control 226-235
 
Table 4.   Skill Family and Current Population Survey Codes. 
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Next, for each Skill Family, data was extracted from the CPS for 1999 male full-
time, full-year workers who have a high school degree or some college in the 18-24 year-
old age group, and who are employed in the civilian occupations that are equivalent to 
each Skill Family.  Finally, the denominator for the relative pay ratio was computed as 
the median annual income earned by those in the comparable civilian occupations.  
Civilian income data for the year 2000 was inflated by increasing the 1999 income data 
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Figure 1.   Earnings in Comparable Civilian Occupations (1998-2000). 
 
Figure 1 presents the average of the 1998 through 2000 median civilian earnings 
computed from the CPS data for enlisted Marines in the 13 Skill Families.  Upon 
examination, Figure 1 reveals a range of civilian earnings across occupations of enlisted 
Marines who faced their first reenlistment decision during fiscal years 1999 through 
2001.  The median earnings in comparable civilian occupations ranged from $14,200 to 
$30,200.  This variation in earnings “justifies an analysis of the relationship between 
compensation and reenlistment using occupation-specific estimates of civilian earnings 
opportunities.” [Ref 12:p. 26]  
SRB multiples are essential in creating additional incentives for a Marine to 
reenlist.  Appendix C details, by PMOS, the SRB multiples offered to Zone A eligible 
Marines in fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  Table 5 displays the average SRB multiples 
offered per Skill Family for fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  Evaluation of Figure 1 in 
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conjunction with Appendix C highlights the incentive created by the SRB.  As an 
illustration, on 1 October 2000 a Corporal with four years of service with PMOS of 0844 
(Field Artillery Fire Control Man) would have compared the median comparable civilian 
income of $24,334, with his military pay of $17,967.  Appendix C demonstrates that the 
Corporal would have been offered a lump sum SRB of $23,956 as an incentive to reenlist 
(SRB Multiple x Monthly Base Pay x Years of Additional Obligated Service = SRB 
Amount): 4 x $1497.30 x 4 = $23,956.80.  The bonus would augment his military pay by 
roughly $6,000 per year (undiscounted) making his military pay roughly comparable to 
his civilian earnings potential. 
 
 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 
Skill Family Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum
                   
ACM 1.00 2.02 5.00 1.00 3.39 5.00 0.00 2.17 5.00 
BA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CL 0.00 .144 0.00 0.00 .189 5.00 0.00 .258 4.00 
CO 0.00 .642 3.00 0.00 .590 1.00 0.00 1.03 3.00 
EL 0.00 1.45 5.00 0.00 2.25 5.00 0.00 1.82 5.00 
FA 0.00 .384 3.00 0.00 1.10 4.00 0.00 1.53 4.00 
FOOD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GT 0.00 3.07 5.00 0.00 4.28 5.00 0.00 3.52 5.00 
LOG 0.00 .397 1.00 0.00 1.27 4.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
MM 0.00 .285 2.00 0.00 .453 2.00 0.00 .810 3.00 
MP 0.00 .430 2.00 0.00 .399 2.00 0.00 .736 2.00 
MT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NAV 0.00 2.95 5.00 0.00 1.21 5.00 0.00 3.69 4.00 
 
Table 5.   Average SRB Multiples Offered per Skill Family: Fiscal Years 1999-2001. 
Source: [Data file described in Chapter IV. A] 
 
E. RETENTION MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The model specifications used in this thesis are categorized by number for easy 
reference.  Table 6 describes each of the model specifications. 
1. Dependent Variable (Models 1, 2, 5, 6) 
The construction of the dichotomous variable (REENLIST) for reenlist/leave 
requires that the Marine be in Zone A and be facing his first opportunity to reenlist.  
Reenlist is coded as a ‘1’ if the Marine chooses to reenlist on active duty and coded as ‘0’ 
if the Marine leaves.  Models 1 and 2 use data for the period 1999-2001.  Models 5 and 6 
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use data for the period 1996 through 2001.  Marines who remain on active duty beyond 
their ECC without reenlisting (extendees) are omitted from the data set used for models 
1, 2, 5, and 6.   
2. Dependent Variable (Models 3 and 4) 
A variation on the basic models (models 1 and 2) is used in this thesis to analyze 
the effect of the SRB on channeling stayers into long-term reenlistments.  Zone A 
Marines who left the Marine Corps at the completion of their initial contract were deleted 
from the data set for models 3 and 4.  Retention will be coded as a ‘1’ if the Marine 





















Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, and UNEMPLOY) for Stayers Only
Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01) for Stayers Only
Basic SRB Model: fiscal years 1996-2001  
Basic MULT Model: fiscal years 1996-2001
Basic SRB Model for Stayers Only
Basic MULT Model for Stayers Only 
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO) for Stayers Only
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, and UNEMPLOY) for Stayers Only
Basic Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Retention Model, FY99-01
Basic Bonus Multiple (MULT) Retention Model, FY99-01
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO)
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, and UNEMPLOY)
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01)
Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO)
Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, and UNEMPLOY)
Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01)
Description
Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01) for Stayers Only
Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO) for Stayers Only
 
 
Table 6.   Description of Models. 
 
3. Explanatory Variables 
Variables were selected for the retention models based on the literature review in 
Chapter II and on the availability of data.  Each variable is defined below in Table 7.  
Table 7 presents the names of the explanatory variables, describes their coding, and the 
expected effect of each on reenlistment.        
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Table 8 details the military-to-civilian pay ratio per Skill Family for fiscal years 
1999 through 2001.   
 




=1 if fiscal year of sample  
  is noted in variable  
+ 
+ 
SRB =1 if Marine offered an  




=1 if Marine offered an  
  SRB multiple during  
  fiscal year noted in  
  variable 
                      ? 
? 
MULT =SRB Multiple (0-5) + 
MULT00 
MULT01 
=MULT * FY00 
=MULT * FY01 
? 
? 
UNEMPLOY = Mean unemployment  
   rate of the sample 
+ 
PAYRATIO = Mean military-to- 
   civilian pay ratio  
+ 
AFQTHIGH =1 if >= 50 - 
NOTWHITE 
FEMALE 
=1 if not white 
=1 if female 
+ 
+ 
MARDEP =1 if married and/or has  
  dependents 
+ 
ZZ_AGE = Mean age of sample - 
 
Table 7.   Model Explanatory Variables. 
 
a. Fiscal Year 
A fiscal year control variable will “pick up any effects that are peculiar to 
the year; these include any changes to attitudes in addition to changes in pay and the 
civilian unemployment rate.” [Ref 16:p. 18]  During fiscal year 2001 the U. S. elected a 
new president who expressed pro-military opinions.  A potential surge of optimism 
motivated by a pro-military administration may induce Marines to reenlist.  Additionally, 
the Marine Corps’ lump sum SRB payment method was initiated in fiscal year 2001 as an 
inducement for Marines to reenlist.  Therefore, fiscal years 2000 and 2001 (FY00 and 
FY01) are expected to have a positive effect on reenlistment when compared to fiscal 
year 1999. 
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b. Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
“Basic pay is the largest component of military compensation.  The most 
significant way in which compensation varies across ratings (equivalent to Marine Corps 
Military Occupational Specialties) is through the payment of selective reenlistment 
bonuses.”  [Ref 12:p. 37]  The offer of a SRB is designed to induce Marines to reenlist by 
offering a positive economic incentive and is expected to have a positive effect on 
reenlistment.  SRB00 and SRB01 are interaction variables constructed by multiplying the 
dummy variable SRB by the fiscal year dummy variables FY00 and FY01.  SRB00 and 
SRB01 are designed to capture any differential effect that SRBs may have on the 
reenlistment decision for Marines facing their first reenlistment decision during 2000-
2001. 
The variable MULT captures the effect of a one-level increase in the 
bonus multiple offered to the Marine making a reenlistment decision.  MULT00 and 
MULT01 are interaction variables constructed by multiplying the variable MULT with 
the fiscal year dummy variables FY00 and FY01.  MULT00 and MULT01 are designed 
to capture any differential effect that a one-level increase in the multiple may have on the 
reenlistment decision for Marines facing their first reenlistment decision during 2000-
2001.  The overall effect of the SRB01 and MULT01 interactive variables upon 
reenlistment is expected to be positive due to the switch to the lump sum payment 
method.  However, some have suggested that the offer of a bonus to certain Marines may 
induce disgruntlement amongst the enlisted force, in which case the bonus would have a 
negative impact upon reenlistment. [Ref 4]  Therefore, the overall effect of the interaction 
variables on reenlistment is unknown. 
c. Unemployment Rate 
UNEMPLOY represents the unemployment rate at the time the Marine 
reenlisted in the Marine’s home of record state.  It is expected that as unemployment rates 
increase, reenlistment in the Marine Corps will increase.  “With higher unemployment 
civilian job prospects decline and the security of the reenlistment contract will be more 




d. Pay Ratio 
PAYRATIO represents the occupation-specific relative pay ratio that was 
constructed for each Marine.  The pay ratio uses the annual earnings for comparable 
civilian occupations as the denominator, and an individual’s base pay (on 1 October of 
the year of his first opportunity to reenlist) as the numerator.  Each Marine’s base pay 
was a function of his rank and years of service (see Appendix B).  Table 8 provides a 
detailed representation of the pay ratio for this data set, per Skill Family for fiscal years 
1999-2001.  A pay ratio above 1.0 implies that military pay exceeds civilian pay in 
comparable occupations, while a pay ratio below 1.0 implies civilian pay exceeds 
military pay.  Only the FOOD Skill Family had a pay ratio greater than 1.0. 
 
 Skill Family 
 NAV CL FA MT MM LOG EL ACM GT MP CO BA FOOD 
Pay 
Ratio .5501 .6258 .6606 .6721 .6866 .6984 .6987 .6690 .7183 .7299 .7308 .7758 1.108 
 
Table 8.   Pay Ratio per Skill Family: Fiscal Years 1999-2001. 
 
e. Armed Forces Qualification Test 
AFQTHIGH is a proxy variable designed to capture the effect of the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test score on reenlistment.  The AFQT is designed to 
"measure the trainability of potential recruits--more specifically, to identify individuals 
who are at high risk of not completing the initial training program." [Ref 34:p. 6]  At the 
most fundamental level, the AFQT is a gauge of aptitude (a prediction of the in-service 
performance of applicants) not a measure of intellectual ability.  [Ref 35:p. 113]  As a 
measure of aptitude, “higher AFQT scores reflect higher trainability and are expected to 
be negatively related to reenlistment because of expanded civilian opportunities” 
compared to those Marines that have lower AFQT scores. [Ref 20:p. 67] 
f. Minority Status 
Minority status is represented by a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the 
Marine is not white (NOTWHITE) and coded ‘0’ if the Marine is white.  The dummy 
variable FEMALE is coded ‘1’ if the Marine is a female.  Civilian earnings opportunities 
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are perceived to be lower for minorities and females.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
minority status and being female will be positively related to reenlistment in the Marine 
Corps. 
g. Marital and Dependent Status 
MARDEP represents the status of a Marine who is married and/or has 
dependents.  The studies outlined in the literature review identified a greater propensity to 
reenlist amongst enlisted persons that are married and/or have dependents.  Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that a Marine who is married and/or has dependents will have a greater 
propensity to reenlist than one who is not married or responsible for dependents.   
h. Age 
ZZ_AGE is a continuous variable that describes a Marine’s age at the 
reenlistment decision point.  Older Marines have families who may grow weary of long 
periods away from their Marine.  Also, older Marines may be more aware of reasonable 
civilian opportunities than younger Marines.  Therefore, age will have a negative effect 
on reenlistment. 
i. Skill Family 
Each Skill Family variable represents a group of Marine occupational 
specialties.  Table 4 and Appendix C detail the individual Skill Families.  North 
(Reference 28) discovered that most military occupational specialties have higher 
reenlistment probabilities relative to the military occupational specialty of Infantry.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that each Skill Family will have a positive effect on 
reenlistment. 
The basic first-term enlisted Marine personnel reenlistment model 
specifications are: 
 
REENLIST = f (SRB, SRB01, AFQTHIGH, NOTWHITE, MARDEP, FEMALE, 
ZZ_AGE, ACM, BA, CL, EL, FA, FOOD, GT, LOG, MM, MP, MT, NAV) 
 
REENLIST = f (MULT, MULT01, AFQTHIGH, NOTWHITE, MARDEP, 





F. STATISTICAL MODEL 
Each of the Marines in the primary data file either reenlisted or separated from the 
Marine Corps.  Similarly, each of the Marines in the secondary data file either reenlisted 
or extended on active duty (all ‘leavers’ were omitted from the secondary data file).  
Thus, each individual is making a choice among discrete alternatives (‘reenlist/leave’, for 
models 1,2, 5, and 6 or ‘reenlist/extend’, for models 3 and 4) on the basis of his 
individual characteristics, the economic environment, and the SRB.  Therefore, a 
binomial logit is the functional form of the multivariate model that will be used to 
examine each Marine’s dichotomous decision.  The dependent variable was created as a 
discrete binary choice where REENLIST = 1 if the Marine’s decision was to reenlist; 
REENLIST = 0 if the Marine’s decision was to leave.  Similarly, the dependent variable 
for models 3 and 4 was created as a discrete binary choice where REENLIST = 1 if the 
Marine’s decision was to reenlist; REENLIST = 0 if the Marine’s decision was to extend. 
The logistic model relates the decision of the ith Marine, Yi, to a k dimensional 
vector of individual characteristics for Marine i, Xi, such that: 
P (Marine i reenlists) = P (Yi = 1Xi) = __1__ 




ln { [Prob (Y =1| Xi)] / [1 – Prob (Y = 1Xi)] }  = α+βXi = Σjα+βjXij 
 
                                                                 
where P is the probability that the ith Marine will reenlist, and β is the coefficient vector 
for each of a Marine’s individual characteristics.  βj may be interpreted as the impact of a 
change in characteristic j on the log of the retention odds ratio, holding the other 
individual characteristics constant. The binomial logit bounds the probability of the 
decision between zero and one, thus restricting the estimating function to credible values. 
[Ref 36:p. 442] 
The estimating equation is estimated by maximum likelihood techniques using the 
statistical software SAS.  The slope of the S-shaped curve, bounded between the values of 
zero and one, is the partial derivative of the logit function.  The partial effect of each 
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explanatory variable is given by: δP/δX= βi(P)(1-P).  When evaluated at the mean of the 
function, the partial effect varies because the rate of change of the probability with 
respect to each explanatory variable involves not only βi but also the level of the 
probability.  Specifically, “the change in the probability associated with a change in one 
of the X variables will be dependent on the value of that variable and on values of other 
X variables.  The slope of the logit model can be directly interpreted as the change in the 
log-odds ratio for a unit change in X, namely, it tells how the log-odds in favor of 
leaving” the Marine Corps can change as say, a Marine is offered an SRB multiple 
greater than zero. [Ref 20:p. 73 and Ref 16:pp. 17-18] 
The logit model estimates a nonlinear relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the probability of reenlistment.  According to Hansen, “the interpretation of 
the coefficients is not straightforward.”  Therefore, “to facilitate an interpretation of the 
results, the ‘marginal effects’ are calculated using the average derivative.” [Ref 12:p. 40] 
Marginal effects of the explanatory variables measure the impact of a one-unit change in 
each variable on the retention probability, holding all other variables constant.   
The differences in the retention probability for a Zone A Marine can be computed 
and compared to the retention probability of a “base-case Zone A Marine” for small 
changes in the explanatory variables.  The base-case individual is used to develop the 
baseline probability of reenlistment.  For this study, the base-case is defined as a single, 
white, male Lance Corporal of average age in the Skill Family Combat.  Since the logit 
function is nonlinear, the value of the derivative is dependent upon where it is evaluated.  
The sample case is normally evaluated at the mean value of the continuous variables. 
[Ref 16:p. 17]  For example, a marginal effect for the variable MARDEP (married and/or 
with dependents) of .08 implies that, for two otherwise identical Marines, the probability 
of reenlistment is 8 percentage points higher for the married Marine than the Marine who 
is not married or with dependents.  If the average reenlistment rate is 15 percent for a 
single, Zone A enlisted “base-case Marine” without dependents, an 8 percentage-point 
increase in the probability of reenlistment is fairly large (about 50 percent higher). [Ref 
12:p. 41]  The analysis in Chapter V will compute marginal effects for the estimated 
coefficients in the logit model.   
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The –2 Log Likelihood statistic is a measure of the goodness-of-fit of the 
equation. [Ref 16]  The –2 Log Likelihood statistic has a chi-square distribution under the 
null hypothesis (that all the explanatory effects of in the model are zero) and the 
procedure produces a p-value for this statistic.  A significant probability value, p < .05, 
indicates that at least one of the coefficients of the explanatory variables is not zero.  
When the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be concluded that the regression model has 
some explanatory value. [Ref 37:p. 323 and Ref 20:p. 74]  All chi-square values reported 
below in Chapter V are statistically significant. 
G. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ZONE A REENLISTMENTS: FY 1999 
THROUGH 2001 
Table 9 details the reenlistment rates for Marines in the primary data file.  
Observations that were deleted from the primary dataset included: 1) observations in 
grades of E0, E1, E2, and E6; 2) Marines with greater than 72 months of active service at 
their decision-point; 3) Marines with existing extensions in the system; 4) all 'stayers' 
who did not reenlist; 5) Marines with prior military service (PSEPs) with other branches 
of the Department of Defense.  Note that there were approximately 700 PSEPs during 
fiscal years 2000 and 2001. [Ref 44]  As seen in Table 9, the reenlistment rate increased 
between fiscal year 1999 and 2001 by 3.9 percentage points, a difference of 17.3 percent.    
 
# Zone A Total Reenlistment
Decision Pt. Reenlistments Rate
FY99 20024 4535 22.6
FY00 18892 4692 24.8
FY01 20039 5303 26.5  
 
Table 9.   Reenlistment Rates: Fiscal Years 1999-2001. 
 
Table 10 displays the ratio of reenlistments to all stayers.  Observations omitted 
from the data file detailed in Table 10 (and analyzed in models 3 and 4) included: 1) 
observations in grades of E0, E1, E2, and E6; 2) Marines with greater than 72 months of 
active service at their decision-point; 3) Marines with existing extensions in the system; 
4) all Marines who did not remain on active duty beyond their initial ECC (‘leavers’); 5) 
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Marines with prior military service (PSEPs) with other branches of the Department of 
Defense.  Table 10 notes that while the ratio of reenlistments to all stayers decreased by 
.3 percentage points between FY99 and FY00, the ratio increased 5.6 percentage points 
(or 7.2 percent) between FY00 and FY01.        
 
# Zone A Total Ratio Reenlistments
Stayers Reenlistments To All Stayers
FY99 5799 4535 78.2
FY00 6023 4692 77.9
FY01 6351 5303 83.5  
Table 10.   Ratio Reenlistments to All Stayers: Fiscal Years 1999-2001. 
 
Tables 11 through 15 detail the characteristics of all Marines in the primary data 
file in the years 1999-2001.  Table 11 gives the overall average reenlistment rate, and the 
reenlistment rates by SRB multiple for fiscal years 1999 through 2000, immediately prior 
to the execution of the Marine Corps’ lump sum SRB payment policy.      
 
# Zone A Percent of Total # of Reenlistment Difference*
Decision Pt. Sample Reenlistments Rate (%) (%pt.)
38916 100 9227 23.7
None 21563 55.4 4927 22.8 Base
Multiple > 0 17353 44.6 4300 24.8 + 1.9
Multiple 1 10692 27.5 2301 21.5 - 1.3
Multiple 2 2291 5.9 649 28.3 + 5.5
Multiple 3 1325 3.4 392 29.6 + 6.7
Multiple 4 1468 3.8 463 31.5 + 8.7
Multiple 5 1577 4.1 495 31.4 + 8.5
Characteristic
Overall Average
SRB Multiple Offered 
* Difference in Reenlistment Rate:  The difference in reenlistment rate compared to "Base Case":  
Table 11.   Reenlistment Rate by Multiple Offered to Marines Making Zone A Reenlistment 
Decisions: Fiscal Years 1999-2000. 
 
Table 11 shows that there were 9,227 reenlistments and 29,689 separations (an 
average reenlistment rate of 23.7) amongst Marines making first-term reenlistment 
decisions in the 1999-2000 period.  As seen in column 2 of Table 11, 44.6 percent of the 
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Marines making their first reenlistment decision during the pre-lump sum policy period 
were offered an SRB; 27.5 percent were offered a level-one bonus, 5.9 percent were 
offered a level-two bonus, 3.4 percent a level-three bonus, 3.8 percent a level-four bonus, 
and 4.1 percent a level-five bonus. The impact of the SRB on reenlistment rates in FY99-
FY00 detailed in Table 11 is not unexpected: the reenlistment rate is 1.9 percentage 
points higher for those offered a SRB (see column 5).  Furthermore, the greatest impact 
of the SRB on the decision to reenlist is for Marines offered level-four and level-five 
multiples.   
Table 12 details the overall reenlistment rate, and the reenlistment rates by SRB 
multiple of the data for 2001, the first year of the lump sum SRB payment policy.  There 
were 5,303 reenlistments and 14,736 separations (an average reenlistment rate of 26.5%) 
amongst Marines making first-term reenlistment decisions during fiscal year 2001.  The 
overall reenlistment rate in 2001 is 2.8 points higher than the rate in the pre-lump sum 
period, 1999-2000.   
 
Delta **
# Zone A Percent of Total # of Reenlistment Difference* Reenlist
Decision Pt. Sample Reenlistments Rate (%) (%pt.) Rate
20039 100 5303 26.5 + 2.8
None 8973 44.8 2445 27.2 Base + 4.4
Multiple > 0 11066 55.2 2858 25.8 - 1.4 + 1.0
Multiple 1 6356 31.7 1412 22.2 - 5.0 + 0.7
Multiple 2 1581 7.9 415 26.2 - 1.0 - 2.1
Multiple 3 1200 6.0 413 34.4 + 7.2 + 4.8
Multiple 4 1266 6.3 415 32.8 + 5.5 + 1.2
Multiple 5 663 3.3 203 30.6 + 3.4 - 0.8
** Difference in reenlistment rate compared to FY 99-00 data
Characteristic
Overall Average
SRB Multiple Offered 
*   Difference in Reenlistment Rate:  The difference in reenlistment rate compared to "Base Case":
 
Table 12.   Reenlistment Rate by Multiple Offered to Marines Making Zone A Reenlistment 
Decisions: Fiscal Year 2001. 
 
During fiscal year 2001, 55.2 percent of the Marines making their first 
reenlistment decision were offered an SRB; of these, 31.7 percent were offered a level-
one bonus, 7.9 percent were offered a level-two bonus, 6.0 percent a level-three bonus, 
6.3 percent a level-four bonus, and 3.3 percent a level-five bonus.       
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The impact of the SRB during fiscal year 2001 is complicated.  Table 12 (column 
6) reveals that the reenlistment rates decreased for Marines offered SRB multiples of two 
and five (compared to FY99-00).  While the average reenlistment rate during FY01 is 1.4 
percentage points lower for Marines offered any SRB (compared to those not offered a 
SRB multiple in 2001), the reenlistment rate for Marines offered any SRB is 1-percentage 
point higher in FY01 than FY99-FY00.  The average reenlistment rate is 5.0 percentage 
points lower and 1.0 percentage points lower for Marines offered multiples of one and 
two, respectively (compared to Marines not offered a SRB multiple in 2001), while the 
reenlistment rates for level-four and five multiples are markedly lower than the 
reenlistment rates for a level-three multiple.  The greatest impact of the SRB on the 
decision to reenlist is for Marines offered a level-three multiple. 
Tables 13 and 14 detail demographic characteristics of the sample before and after 
the change in the SRB payment policy.  Tables 13 and 14 detail the percentage of the 
sample represented by each characteristic, the reenlistment rate for each demographic 
characteristic, and the difference in the reenlistment rate between the base-case and each 
characteristic.  Additionally, Table 14 (column 6) displays the difference in reenlistment 
rates 2001 and 1999-2000.  
As expected, Table 13 displays that Marines in higher grades are more likely to 
reenlist.  As seen in Table 13 (column 4), while only 11.7 percent of Lance Corporals 
reenlisted during FY99-FY00, 24.7 percent of Corporals and 33.6 percent of Sergeants 
reenlisted. 
The next three categories of variables listed in Table 13 summarize the 
relationships between marital status, gender, race, and retention.  The results generally 
support findings of the studies outlined in Chapter II.  The reenlistment rate of women is 
4.1 percentage points higher than the rate for men.  Reenlistment rates of Marines are 
sharply delineated by marital/dependency status and race.  That is, Marines who are 
married and/or have dependents are 10.7 percentage points more likely to reenlist than 
those who are not married nor have dependents, and non-white Marines are 37 percent 
more likely to reenlist than whites.   
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Table 13, column 4, shows the reenlistment rates for Marines in the AFQT 
categories used in this study.  Generally, high AFQT scorers (categories I and II) are 
slightly less likely than other Marines to reenlist.  Cursory evaluation of the relationship 
between AFQT test score categories and the reenlistment/leave decision reveals results 
that are not unexpected: the FY99-FY00 reenlistment rate for category I Marines is a full 
percentage point lower than the base case.      
 
# Zone A Percent of Total # of Reenlistment Difference*
Decision Pt. Sample Reenlistments Rate (%) (%pt.)
38916 100 9227 23.7
LCPL 7785 20.0 914 11.7 Base
CPL 24019 61.7 5923 24.7 + 12.9
SGT 7112 18.3 2390 33.6 + 21.9
21295 54.7 4016 18.9 Base
17621 45.3 5211 29.6 + 10.7
Male 36886 94.8 8667 23.5 Base
Female 2030 5.2 560 27.6 + 4.1
Race
White 28578 73.4 6170 21.6 Base
Not White 10338 26.6 3057 29.6 + 8.0
AFQT Score
AFQT I 1430 3.7 328 22.9 - 1.0
AFQT II 14414 37.0 3382 23.5 - 0.5
AFQT IIIa 10601 27.2 2531 23.9 -0.1
AFQT LOW 12447 32.0 2978 23.9 Base
2111 5.4 671 31.8 + 15.3
248 0.6 69 27.8 + 11.4
5409 13.9 1606 29.7 + 13.2
5447 14.0 1402 25.7 +   9.3
1962 5.0 373 19.0 +   2.5
902 2.3 224 24.8 +   8.4
1432 3.7 367 25.6 +   9.2
1304 3.4 392 30.1 + 13.6
4805 12.3 1157 24.1 +   7.6
2756 7.1 624 22.6 +   6.2
3855 9.9 857 22.2 +   5.8
326 0.8 109 33.4 + 17.0
























Table 13.   Reenlistment Rate by Characteristics of Marines Making Zone A Reenlistment 
Decisions: Fiscal Years 1999-2000. 
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Table 13 displays that while the lowest reenlistment rates during FY99-00 are 
associated with Marines from infantry, artillery, military police, and motor transport-
related occupations, reenlistees are more likely to be from aviation-support, logistical, 
and clerical occupations.  Specifically, while Marines in Field Artillery are 2.5 
percentage points more likely to reenlist than infantry Marines, Marines in Navigator/Air 
Traffic Control and Aircraft Maintenance are 17 and 15.3 percentage points, respectively 
more likely to reenlist than infantry Marines.      
 
Delta **
# Zone A Percent of Total # of Reenlistment Difference* Reenlist
Decision Pt. Sample Reenlistments Rate (%) (%pt.) Rate
20039 100 5303 26.5 + 2.8
LCPL 4654 23.2 696 15.0 Base + 3.2
CPL 12274 61.3 3467 28.2 + 13.3 + 3.6
SGT 3111 15.5 1140 36.6 + 21.7 + 3.0
11331 56.5 2475 21.8 Base + 3.0
8708 43.5 2828 32.5 + 10.6 + 2.9
Male 18779 93.7 4930 26.3 Base + 2.8
Female 1260 6.3 373 29.6 + 3.4 + 2.0
Race
White 14174 70.7 3407 24.0 Base + 2.4
Not White 5865 29.3 1896 32.3 + 8.3 + 2.8
AFQT Score
AFQT I 705 3.5 186 26.4 + 0.0 + 3.4
AFQT II 6838 34.1 1775 26.0 - 0.4 + 2.5
AFQT IIIa 5606 28.0 1524 27.2 + 0.9 + 3.3
AFQT LOW 6881 34.3 1812 26.3 Base + 2.4
1087 5.4 363 33.4 + 14.2 +   1.6
123 0.6 38 30.9 + 11.7 +   3.1
3142 15.7 1022 32.5 + 13.3 +   2.8
3050 15.2 828 27.1 + 7.9 +   1.4
907 4.5 264 29.1 + 9.9 + 10.1
444 2.2 110 24.8 + 5.5 -   0.1
944 4.7 293 31.0 + 11.8 +   5.4
542 2.7 166 30.6 + 11.4 +   0.6
2588 12.9 636 24.6 + 5.3 +   0.5
1235 6.2 309 25.0 + 5.8 +   2.4
1825 9.1 448 24.5 + 5.3 +   2.3
176 0.9 61 34.7 + 15.4 +   1.2






















* Difference in Reenlistment Rate = The difference in reenlistment rate compared to "Base Case."
** Difference in reenlistment rate compared to FY 99-00 data  
Table 14.   Reenlistment Rate by Characteristics of Marines Making Zone A Reenlistment 
Decisions: Fiscal Year 2001. 
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The results detailed in Table 14 note that during FY01 Marines in higher grades 
are more likely to reenlist.  As seen in column 4, while only 15.0 percent of Lance 
Corporals reenlisted during FY01, 28.2 percent of Corporals and 36.6 percent of 
Sergeants reenlisted.  Furthermore, column 6 highlights that the reenlistment rates during 
fiscal year 2001 increased by 3.2 percentage points for Lance Corporals, 3.6 percentage 
points for Corporals and 3.0 percentage points for Sergeants (compared to FY99-00).   
Note that the data in Table 14 (column 6) show that reenlistment rates during 
FY01 increased by the same magnitude for married and non-married Marines when 
compared to FY99-00.  Closer analysis of the effect on reenlistment in FY01 reveals a 
narrowing difference in reenlistment rates between high AFQT scorers and Marines who 
scored below 50 percent on the AFQT; the FY01 reenlistment rates for category I 
Marines were a full percentage point higher than the base case. 
Other differences in reenlistment rates include higher rates for females and non-
whites.  Comparison of reenlistment rates displayed in column 4 of Tables 13 and 14 
reveal that rates increased over time for all gender and race categories.  That is, while the 
female reenlistment rate during FY99-FY00 was 27.6 percent, the rate for women 
Marines was 29.6 percent during FY01.  Furthermore, while the reenlistment rate for 
non-white Marines during FY99-FY00 was 29.6 percentage points, the rate for non-white 
Marines was 32.3 percent in FY01. 
Differences in reenlistment rates between Skill Families are detailed in column 6 
of Table 14.  Marines who reenlisted during FY01 are less likely to be from infantry, 
food service, motor transport, and mechanical maintenance occupations, and more likely 
to be from aviation-support, general technical, and clerical occupations.  The greatest 
increase in reenlistment rates between the non-lump sum payment period and FY01 is in 
the Field Artillery and General Technical Skill Families.  That is, the reenlistment rates 
were 10.1 percentage points and 5.4 percentage points higher in FY01 (compared to 
FY99-00) for Field Artillery and General Technical, respectively.  The average 
(unweighted) increase in reenlistment rates amongst all Skill Families was 2.6 percentage 
points.   
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Table 15 presents tabulated annual reenlistment rates per Skill Family by bonus 
multiple.  The rates in each column of Table 15 are the quotient of the number of 
Marines, per Skill Family, per fiscal year, who reenlisted divided by the number of 
Marines, per Skill Family, per fiscal year, who were offered the multiple listed in the 
column.  As an illustration, while 46 Marines in FY01 (in NAV) were targeted with a 
level-2 bonus, only 11 reenlisted, for a reenlistment rate of 23.9 percent.  A bonus was 
not offered in cells marked ‘n.a.’    Evaluation of Table 15 in conjunction with Table 14 
augments the details provided in this chapter.  Table 15 shows that reenlistment rates 
during FY01 in four Skill Families (Clerical, Combat, Electronics Repair, and General 
Technical) are markedly higher for Marines offered relatively low SRB multiples.  For 
example, a Marine in the Skill Family GT (during FY01) was 5.4 points less likely to 
reenlist when offered a level-5 bonus than a Marine offered a level-4 bonus.   
It is noteworthy that Table 14 shows that Marines in the Combat Skill Family 
account for 19.8 percent of the sample.  While 36.7 percent of Marines (in Combat) 
offered a multiple of three reenlisted, 100 percent reenlisted who were not offered a SRB 
multiple.  A similar pattern of reenlistment rates is noted for Clerical (15.7 percent of the 
sample), Electronics Repair (15.2 percent of the sample), and General Technical (4.7 
percent of the sample).  For example, while 28.4 percent of the Marines (in General 
Technical) offered a multiple of five reenlisted, 30.2 percent and 33.3 percent reenlisted 
who were offered multiples of one and zero, respectively.  Table 15 reveals a marked 
increase in reenlistment rates (between FY00 and FY01) at three SRB multiple levels for 
Marines in Field Artillery.  That is, reenlistment rates increased from 15.2 to 100 percent, 
21.4 to 27.1 percent, and 25.0 to 35.9 percent for artillery Marines offered multiples of 
zero, one, and three, respectively.          
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Skill Family FY Skill Family FY
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
99 n.a. 25.1 28.5 41.0 40.2 36.4 99 20.0 23.1 19.8 25.0 17.4 35.4
ACM 00 n.a. 31.3 27.0 26.7 40.3 39.7 GT 00 66.7 n.a. 23.6 37.8 26.7 28.8
01 33.9 40.0 28.8 34.5 33.8 40.7 01 33.3 30.2 16.3 35.4 33.8 28.4
99 26.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 99 26.4 30.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BA 00 29.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. LOG 00 31.9 24.2 34.5 n.a. 38.5 n.a.
01 30.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 01 35.3 30.3 26.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
99 28.3 35.1 41.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 99 23.8 23.6 23.9 18.9 n.a. n.a.
CL 00 29.8 31.1 32.3 n.a. n.a. 50.0 MM 00 23.0 27.2 26.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
01 31.5 36.9 40.6 44.0 34.5 n.a. 01 23.8 25.7 23.9 30.3 n.a. n.a.
99 14.8 16.5 n.a. 27.3 n.a. n.a. 99 20.6 20.4 28.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
CO 00 17.1 16.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. MP 00 21.8 28.5 39.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
01 100.0 19.0 n.a. 36.7 n.a. n.a. 01 25.0 23.9 29.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
99 20.5 27.9 26.3 25.1 28.0 25.9 99 21.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EL 00 19.0 26.5 22.5 26.4 37.9 28.6 MT 00 23.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
01 25.0 29.0 24.1 32.4 29.8 31.4 01 24.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
99 16.2 16.0 50.0 26.1 n.a. n.a. 99 15.0 n.a. 24.6 n.a. 37.5 38.9
FA 00 15.2 21.4 n.a. 25.0 38.2 n.a. NAV 00 40.2 n.a. 25.8 n.a. n.a. 34.6
01 100.0 27.1 n.a. 35.9 38.2 n.a. 01 n.a. n.a. 23.9 n.a. 39.1 n.a.
99 22.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FOOD 00 27.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
01 24.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note:  n. a. = No bonus offered
SRB Multiple SRB Multiple
 
Table 15.   Zone A Reenlistment Rates per Skill Family by Multiple: Fiscal Years 1999-
2001. 
While tabulations of reenlistment rates by different characteristics of Marines 
making reenlistment decisions can provide considerable insight into the factors associated 
with the reenlistment decision, they can also obscure relationships important to Marine 
Corps planners.  That is, Table 15 is based on tabulations and thus gives unusual results.  
Specifically, as the multiple level increases, reenlistment rates decrease for various Skill 
Families in particular years.  To obtain valid estimates of the effects of particular 
variables on the reenlistment decision, a multivariate model must be estimated.  Only in 
such a model can confounding effects be statistically separated. [Ref 16:p. 17] 
        
47 
V. LOGIT MODEL RESULTS 
A. RETENTION MODELS  (MODELS 1 AND 2) 
1. Basic Retention Models (Models 1A and 2A) 
Tables 16 and 17 show the results of the basic retention models.  The effect of the 
selective reenlistment bonus is consistent with expectations.  The marginal effect in Table 
16 shows that a Marine offered a SRB is 3.2 percentage points more likely to reenlist 
than one who is not offered a SRB.  Table 17 shows that a one-level increase in the SRB 
multiple increases the propensity of a Marine to reenlist by 1.9 percentage points.  Tables 
16 and 17 suggest that the impact of the lump sum bonus offered in FY01 appears to be 
larger than the partial installment bonus offered in FY99 and FY00.  Table 16 shows that 
the impact of being offered a SRB increased by 2.6 percentage points between fiscal 
years 1999-2000 and 2001.  Similarly, in Table 17 the impact of a one-level increase in 
the SRB multiple increased the probability of reenlistment by .7 percentage points 
between fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2001. 
The effects of variables AFQTHIGH, NOTWHITE, and MARDEP were 
consistent with expectations.  The variable AFQTHIGH (see Tables 16 and 17) had a 
negative impact upon a Marine’s likelihood to reenlist.  A Marine who scores above the 
50th percentile on the AFQT is .6 to .9 percentage points less likely to reenlist.  Models 
1A and 2A indicated a significant, positive relationship between race and the propensity 
to reenlist.  Holding all other variables constant, a non-white Marine has a 6.9 to 7.1-
percentage point higher propensity to reenlist.  Similarly, a Marine who is married and/or 
has dependents is 10.2 percentage-points more likely to reenlist than one who has neither 
a spouse nor children.   
The variables FEMALE and ZZ_AGE produced unexpected signs.  Perhaps this is 
due to the small number of females in the data set.  However, further analysis of Table 14 
(Chapter IV) reveals that the greatest increase in reenlistment rates by SRB multiple took 
place in the Skill Family Field Artillery; this Skill Family is manned solely by men.  A 
one-year increase in a Marine’s age has a negligible effect upon the probability to 
reenlist. 
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The Skill Family variables produced a wide range of marginal effects.  Models 1A 
and 2A reveal that Marines in all Skill Families are more likely to reenlist than those in 
infantry.  When the model controls for SRB, Marines in field artillery, motor transport, 
and military police occupations have the lowest marginal effects and air traffic 
controllers, band members, and aircraft maintenance personnel have the highest marginal 
effects (see Table 16).  However, when the model controls for the SRB multiple, Marines 
in field artillery, motor transport, and general technical have the lowest marginal effects 
and band members, air traffic controllers, and clerical Marines have the highest marginal 
effects (see Table 17). 
2. Basic Retention Models with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01 
Variables (Models 1B, 1C, 1D, 2B, 2C, 2D) 
Results of estimating the various specifications of models 1 and 2 are shown in 
Tables 18 through 23.  The marginal effects listed in Tables 18 through 23 show that a 
Marine offered a SRB is 2.4 to 2.9 percentage points more likely to reenlist than one who 
is not offered a SRB.  Further, a one-level increase in the SRB multiple increases the 
propensity of a Marine to reenlist by 1.4 to 1.7 percentage points.  The impact of the 
lump sum bonus appears to vary in significance as controls for unemployment, the 
relative pay ratio, and the fiscal years are added to models 1B, 1C, and 1D.  This is not 
unexpected, given that it may be that models 1B, 1C, 1D, 2B, 2C, and 2D cannot 
distinguish between a general increase in retention in FY01 and the increase in retention 
due to switching to a lump sum payment method. [Ref 43]  Another way to state this is 
that the effects changes in SRB01 and MULT01 may be matched exactly by the relative 
changes over time of other variables (i.e., FY00, FY01, UNEMPLOY, and PAYRATIO).  
The estimation procedure may be incapable of distinguishing the effects of these time-
varying variables, thus causing problems for estimation. [Ref 36:p. 90-91]  The mixing of 
pay and bonus variables in the specification may bias the effect of the bonus.  Further, the 
marginal effects of SRB01 and MULT01 (in models 1D and 2D) are relatively small.  





Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
SRB .4820 .1712 .027*** 0.032
SRB00 .1528 X X X
SRB01 .1877 .1286 .029*** 0.058
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7317 X X X
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0310    .022 -0.006
NOTWHITE .2748 .3591 .022*** 0.069
MARDEP .4466 .5299 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0851    .041** -0.016
ZZ_AGE 22.754 .0091    .005* 0.002
ACM .0542 .7452 .046*** 0.138
BA .0063 .8571 .121*** 0.159
CL .1450 .7183 .038*** 0.133
EL .1441 .4818 .036*** 0.089
FA .0487 .2628 .052*** 0.049
FOOD .0228 .4388 .071*** 0.081
GT .0403 .5565 .053*** 0.103
LOG .0313 .6523 .057*** 0.121
MM .1254 .4407 .038*** 0.082
MP .0677 .4051 .046*** 0.075
MT .0963 .3970 .044*** 0.074
NAV .0085 .8685 .099*** 0.161
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -2.200
ADJ R SQ. .0467
N 58922
CHI SQ 1881.3***
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
        change in the explanatory variable.  
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
MULT .9245 .1015 .011*** 0.019
MULT00 .3158 X X X
MULT01 .3646 .0320 .012*** 0.026
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7317 X X X
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0485 .022** -0.009
NOTWHITE .2748 .3701 .022*** 0.071
MARDEP .4466 .5294 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0782   .041* -0.015
ZZ_AGE 22.754 .0068   .005 0.001
ACM .0542 .5791 .049*** 0.107
BA .0063 .7812 .119*** 0.145
CL .1450 .6342 .035*** 0.118
EL .1441 .3257 .037*** 0.060
FA .0487 .2081 .052*** 0.039
FOOD .0228 .3479 .069*** 0.065
GT .0403 .2886 .059*** 0.054
LOG .0313 .5957 .057*** 0.110
MM .1254 .3825 .037*** 0.071
MP .0677 .3666 .045*** 0.068
MT .0963 .3086 .041*** 0.057
NAV .0085 .6498 .101*** 0.121
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -2.0567
ADJ R SQ. .0480
N 58922
CHI SQ 1934.0***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
 
Table 17.   Basic Multiple (MULT) Retention Model: FY99-01 (Model 2A). 
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The coefficient on the military-to-civilian pay ratio is positive and statistically 
significant (see Tables 18 through 23).  It is difficult to translate either the coefficient or 
marginal effect of relative pay into a relationship between changes in pay and the 
propensity to reenlist.  [Ref 12:p. 42]  Therefore, Tables 18 through 23 calculate the 
effect of PAYRATIO as the elasticity.  Pay elasticity is defined as the percentage change 
in reenlistment associated with a 1-percent change in the military-to-civilian pay ratio.  
An elasticity of 2.8 (the marginal effect of PAYRATIO) implies that the responsiveness 
of Marine Corps reenlistment to changes in the ratio of military-to-civilian pay is well in 
line with prior studies.  [Ref 16:p. 23]  That is, all things being equal, a 1-percent increase 
in the relative pay ratio is related to a 2.8-percent increase in the reenlistment rate.   
The effects of variables AFQTHIGH, ZZ_AGE, NOTWHITE, and MARDEP 
were consistent with expectations.  The variables AFQTHIGH and ZZ_AGE (see Tables 
18 through 23) had significant, negative impacts upon a Marine’s likelihood to reenlist.  
Tables 18 through 23 show that a Marine who scores above the 50th percentile on the 
AFQT is 1.4 to 1.7 percentage points less likely to reenlist.  A one-year increase in a 
Marine’s age has a negligible effect upon the probability to reenlist.  The models detailed 
in Tables 18 through 23 indicated a significant, positive relationship between race and the 
propensity to reenlist.  Holding all other variables constant, a non-white Marine has a 7.3 
to 7.5-percentage point higher propensity to reenlist.  Similarly, a Marine who is married 
and/or has dependents is 10.2 percentage-points more likely to reenlist than one who has 
neither a spouse nor children.   
The variable UNEMPLOY produced an unexpected sign.  Contrary to 
expectations, models 1C, 2C, 1D, and 2D indicated a negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the propensity to reenlist.  The marginal effect of (-.004) suggests 
that an increase in the unemployment rate from 4.15-percent to 5.15-percent would be 
associated with a very minor decrease in the average reenlistment rate.  This is 
counterintuitive, but represents a relatively negligible effect.  Although the 
unemployment rate varies by year, it is constant within a year, thus making it collinear 
with other fiscal year variables.   
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A woman is 1.7 percentage points less likely to reenlist than a man.  This result is 
unexpected.  Perhaps this is due to the small number of females in the data set.  However, 
it was pointed out earlier that the greatest increase in reenlistment rates by SRB multiple 
took place in the Skill Families Combat and Field Artillery, which are manned solely by 
Marine Corps men. 
The Skill Family variables produced a wide range of marginal effects that varied 
significantly when the model controlled for relative pay.  That is, while models 1A and 
2A reveal that Marines in all of the Skill Families are more likely to reenlist than a 
Marine in the Skill Family CO, models 1B, 2B, 1C, 2C, 1D, and 2D reveal that Marines 
in the Skill Families Food and Logistics are less likely to reenlist than a Marine in the 
Skill Family Combat.  A Marine in the Skill Family Food is approximately 29 percentage 
points less likely to reenlist than the omitted, base-case (Combat).  Perhaps this could be 
attributed to two significant policy factors.  First, in FY99 the food service MOS was 
downsized.  While Marines retained their food service designation, 549 were re-assigned 
to various occupational specialties.  Second, food service Marines were not offered a 
bonus during FY99-01.  A logistics Marine is 2.4 percentage points less likely to reenlist 
than the base-case.   
Overall, reenlistment behavior is consistent with the SRB multiples offered during 
fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  When the model controls relative compensation, 
Marines in the Skill Families offered the highest average multiples are more likely to 
reenlist than Marines in other Skill Families.  Specifically, Marines in the Skill Families 
NAV, ACM, EL, and GT were offered average SRB multiples of 2.6, 2.51, 1.8, and 3.6, 
respectively during fiscal years 1999 through 2001 (see Chapter IV, Table 5).  As an 
illustration, the variable NAV produced the highest marginal effect of all the Skill 
Families.  This is counterintuitive.  Of all the Skill Families, Marines in the Skill Family 
NAV have the highest civilian earnings (with a military-to-civilian pay ratio of .5501).  
However, the average multiples recorded in Table 5 suggest that this is associated with 
the relatively high average SRB multiples offered per fiscal year (2.95, 1.21, and 3.69 in 
FY99, FY00, and FY01, respectively).   
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The variables ACM, EL, and GT produced expected results.  Table 5 pointed out 
that these three Skill Families were offered three of the four highest average SRB 
multiples for each of the fiscal years evaluated.  Tables 18 through 23 reveal that Marines 
in aircraft maintenance, electronics maintenance, and general technical specialties are 8.8 
to 17.7 percentage points more likely to reenlist than Marines in the Skill Family CO.  
However, a Marine in the motor transportation specialty was not offered a multiple 
during FY99-01, yet is 7.1 to 11.9 percentage points more likely to reenlist than the 










Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
SRB .4820 .1268 .028*** 0.024
SRB00 .1528 X X X
SRB01 .1877 .0264    .029 0.030
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7317 5.108 .185*** 2.818
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0762 .023*** -0.015
NOTWHITE .2748 .3768 .022*** 0.073
MARDEP .4466 .5265 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0902    .042** -0.017
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0132 .005*** -0.003
ACM .0542 .9561 .047*** 0.177
BA .0063 .5786 .124*** 0.107
CL .1450 .4406 .040*** 0.082
EL .1441 .6586 .036*** 0.122
FA .0487 .6131 .053*** 0.114
FOOD .0228 -1.559 .102*** -0.289
GT .0403 .6603 .054*** 0.122
LOG .0313 -.1242    .065* -0.023
MM .1254 .5059 .038*** 0.094
MP .0677 .4068 .046*** 0.075
MT .0963 .6402 .046*** 0.119
NAV .0085 1.830 .106*** 0.339
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.3661
ADJ R SQ. .0657
N 58922
CHI SQ 2662.2***
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
        change in the explanatory variable.  
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
SRB .4820 .1278 .028*** 0.024
SRB00 .1528 X X X
SRB01 .1877 .0197    .029 0.029
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 -.0273    .012** -0.005
PAYRATIO b .7317 5.099 .185*** 2.813
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0746 .023*** -0.014
NOTWHITE .2748 .3839 .023*** 0.074
MARDEP .4466 .5274 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0910    .042** -0.018
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0133 .005*** -0.003
ACM .0542 .9545 .047*** 0.177
BA .0063 .5794 .124*** 0.107
CL .1450 .4393 .040*** 0.081
EL .1441 .6569 .036*** 0.122
FA .0487 .6141 .054*** 0.114
FOOD .0228 -1.557 .102*** -0.289
GT .0403 .6589 .054*** 0.122
LOG .0313 -.1244    .065* -0.023
MM .1254 .5060 .038*** 0.094
MP .0677 .4068 .046*** 0.075
MT .0963 .6386 .046*** 0.118
NAV .0085 1.827 .106*** 0.339
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.2475
ADJ R SQ. .0658
N 58922
CHI SQ 2667.6***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 .0032    .025 0.001
FY01 .3399 .1063 .032*** 0.021
SRB .4820 .1582 .029*** 0.029
SRB00 .1528 X X X
SRB01 .1877 -.0859 .042** 0.014
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 -.0220    .012* -0.004
PAYRATIO b .7317 5.099 .187*** 2.813
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0711 .023*** -0.014
NOTWHITE .2748 .3805 .023*** 0.073
MARDEP .4466 .5282 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0945    .042** -0.018
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0131    .005** -0.003
ACM .0542 .9391 .047*** 0.174
BA .0063 .5697 .123*** 0.106
CL .1450 .4252 .040*** 0.079
EL .1441 .6404 .037*** 0.119
FA .0487 .6170 .054*** 0.114
FOOD .0228 -1.569 .102*** -0.291
GT .0403 .6519 .054*** 0.121
LOG .0313 -.1293    .065** -0.024
MM .1254 .4991 .038*** 0.093
MP .0677 .4013 .046*** 0.074
MT .0963 .6292 .046*** 0.117
NAV .0085 1.826 .106*** 0.339
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.3004
ADJ R SQ. .0661
N 58922
CHI SQ 2679.7***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 
Table 20.   Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01)  (Model 1D). 
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Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
MULT .9245 .0702 .011*** 0.013
MULT00 .3158 X X X
MULT01 .3646 .0178   .012 0.017
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7317 5.034 .184*** 2.777
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0879 .023*** -0.017
NOTWHITE .2748 .3839 .022*** 0.074
MARDEP .4466 .5270 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0859   .042** -0.017
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0145 .005*** -0.003
ACM .0542 .8438 .050*** 0.157
BA .0063 .5423 .122*** 0.101
CL .1450 .3965 .036*** 0.074
EL .1441 .5561 .038*** 0.103
FA .0487 .5695 .054*** 0.106
FOOD .0228 -1.581 .099*** -0.293
GT .0403 .4798 .060*** 0.089
LOG .0313 -.1477   .064** -0.027
MM .1254 .4708 .037*** 0.087
MP .0677 .3850 .046*** 0.071
MT .0963 .5870 .042*** 0.109
NAV .0085 1.668 .108*** 0.309
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.2332
ADJ R SQ. .0666
N 58922
CHI SQ 2698.7***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 X X X
FY01 .3399 X X X
MULT .9245 .0704 .011*** 0.013
MULT00 .3158 X X X
MULT01 .3646 .0158   .012 0.017
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 -.0258   .012** -0.005
PAYRATIO b .7317 5.022 .184*** 2.771
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0862 .023*** -0.017
NOTWHITE .2748 .3906 .023*** 0.075
MARDEP .4466 .5279 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0867   .042** -0.017
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0145 .005*** -0.003
ACM .0542 .8432 .050*** 0.156
BA .0063 .5441 .122*** 0.101
CL .1450 .3962 .036*** 0.073
EL .1441 .5557 .038*** 0.103
FA .0487 .5704 .054*** 0.106
FOOD .0228 -1.577 .099*** -0.293
GT .0403 .4798 .060*** 0.089
LOG .0313 -.1469   .064** -0.027
MM .1254 .4715 .037*** 0.087
MP .0677 .3854 .046*** 0.071
MT .0963 .5863 .042*** 0.109
NAV .0085 1.666 .108*** 0.309
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.1202
ADJ R SQ. .0667
N 58922
CHI SQ 2703.5***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3204 -.0100   .025 -0.002
FY01 .3399 .0616   .029** 0.012
MULT .9245 .0782 .011*** 0.015
MULT00 .3158 X X X
MULT01 .3646 -.0069   .015 0.014
UNEMPLOY 4.1503 -.0222   .012* -0.004
PAYRATIO b .7317 4.997 .186*** 2.757
AFQTHIGH .6720 -.0840 .023*** -0.016
NOTWHITE .2748 .3882 .023*** 0.075
MARDEP .4466 .5287 .020*** 0.102
FEMALE .0558 -.0884   .042** -0.017
ZZ_AGE 22.754 -.0143 .005*** -0.003
ACM .0542 .8369 .050*** 0.155
BA .0063 .5453 .122*** 0.101
CL .1450 .3951 .036*** 0.073
EL .1441 .5523 .038*** 0.102
FA .0487 .5705 .054*** 0.106
FOOD .0228 -1.568 .099*** -0.291
GT .0403 .4767 .060*** 0.088
LOG .0313 -.1425   .065** -0.026
MM .1254 .4717 .037*** 0.087
MP .0677 .3849 .046*** 0.071
MT .0963 .5855 .043*** 0.109
NAV .0085 1.668 .108*** 0.309
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
CONSTANT -5.1387
ADJ R SQ. .0668
N 58922
CHI SQ 2710.2***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlistment Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 
Table 23.   Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01) (Model 
2D). 
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B. STAYER-ONLY RETENTION MODELS  (MODELS 3 AND 4) 
A separate analysis was undertaken to analyze the effect of the SRB on 
channeling stayers (Marines who remained beyond their ECC) into long-term 
reenlistments.  The analysis detailed in models 3 and 4 restricted the sample to Marines 
who reenlisted or extended.  The results of the various specifications of models 3 and 4 
are shown in Tables 24 through 31. 
1. Stayer-Only Basic Retention Models (Models 3A and 4A) 
The basic findings for models 3A and 4A are remarkably close to those 
highlighted in models 1A and 2A.  That is, while a stayer offered a SRB is 2.5 percentage 
points more likely to reenlist (than extend) than a stayer who is not offered a SRB, a one-
level increase in the SRB multiple increases the propensity of a ‘stayer’ to reenlist by 1.5 
percentage points.  Models 3A and 4A suggest that the impact of the lump sum bonus 
offered in FY01 appears to be larger than the partial installment bonus offered in FY99 
and FY00.  Specifically, a stayer offered a lump sum SRB is 5.5 percentage points more 
likely to reenlist than a Marine offered an installment bonus in FY99-FY00.  Thus, the 
impact of the SRB on a stayer’s reenlistment decision increased by 3.0 percentage points 
between fiscal years 1999 and 2001.  Similarly, the impact of a one-level increase in the 
SRB multiple increased by .8 percentage points between fiscal years 1999 and 2001. 
The effects of variables AFQTHIGH, NOTWHITE, and MARDEP were 
consistent with expectations.  The variable AFQTHIGH (see Tables 24 and 25) had 
negative impacts upon a Marine’s relative probability of reenlisting versus extending.  A 
Marine who scores above the 50th percentile on the AFQT is 1.2 to 1.5 percentage points 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
SRB .4846 .1578 .053*** 0.025
SRB00 .1584 X X X
SRB01 .1907 .2382 .059*** 0.055
UNEMPLOY 4.154 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7439 X X X
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.0758   .043* -0.012
NOTWHITE .3332 .1638 .044*** 0.026
MARDEP .5102 .8392 .040*** 0.134
FEMALE .0632 -.1188   .081 -0.019
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0659 .010*** 0.011
ACM .0672 .6418 .093*** 0.103
BA .0069 1.022 .259*** 0.164
CL .1836 .3869 .070*** 0.062
EL .1455 .7286 .070*** 0.117
FA .0443 .3523 .098*** 0.056
FOOD .0232 .4482 .135*** 0.072
GT .0438 .6139 .106*** 0.098
LOG .0368 .6710 .115*** 0.107
MM .1214 .5722 .072*** 0.092
MP .0641 .4732 .088*** 0.076
MT .0894 .5455 .084*** 0.087
NAV .0103 1.378 .261*** 0.220
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -1.0419
ADJ R SQ. .0705
N 18157
CHI SQ 829.4***
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
FY01 Reenlist to Stayers Rate
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
MULT 1.004 .0908 .022*** 0.015
MULT00 .3553 X X X
MULT01 .3994 .0781 .026*** 0.023
UNEMPLOY 4.154 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7439 X X X
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.0917   .043** -0.015
NOTWHITE .3332 .1739 .044*** 0.028
MARDEP .5102 .8377 .040*** 0.134
FEMALE .0632 -.1120   .081 -0.018
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0636 .010*** 0.010
ACM .0672 .4648 .098*** 0.074
BA .0069 .9308 .257*** 0.149
CL .1836 .2906 .064*** 0.046
EL .1455 .5722 .072*** 0.092
FA .0443 .3014 .098*** 0.048
FOOD .0232 .3448 .132*** 0.055
GT .0438 .3385 .118*** 0.054
LOG .0368 .6081 .115*** 0.097
MM .1214 .5034 .070*** 0.081
MP .0641 .4251 .087*** 0.068
MT .0894 .4441 .078*** 0.071
NAV .0103 1.160 .263*** 0.186
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -.8864
ADJ R SQ. .0708
N 18157
CHI SQ 832.7***
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
FY01 Reenlist to Stayer Rate
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
 
Table 25.   Basic MULT Model for Stayers Only (Model 4A). 
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Models 3A and 4A indicated a significant, positive relationship between race and 
the propensity to reenlist.  However, the impact was markedly lower for stayers 
compared to the sample in models 1A and 2A.  Holding all other variables constant, a 
non-white stayer has a 2.6 to 2.8-percentage point higher probability of reenlisting versus 
extending.  That is, while a non-white Marine is approximately 7.0 percentage points 
more likely to reenlist (than leave active duty) than a white Marine, the same non-white 
Marine is less than half as likely to reenlist than extend.  Similarly, a Marine who is 
married and/or has dependents is 13.4 percentage points more likely to reenlist (than 
extend) than one who has neither a spouse nor children. Another way to state this is that a 
stayer who is married and/or has dependents is 30 percent more likely to reenlist (when 
offered the choice to reenlist or extend) than when he has the choice to reenlist or leave 
active duty (compared to a stayer who has neither a spouse nor children).  The results 
suggest that a Marine who is white or has family commitments is more likely to reenlist 
(versus extend) than a stayer who is not white or is without family obligations.     
The variables FEMALE and ZZ_AGE produced unexpected signs.  A Marine 
Corps woman is approximately 2.0 percentage points less likely to reenlist (than extend) 
than a man. Perhaps the sign change for the variable FEMALE is due to the small number 
of females in the data set.  A one-year increase in a Marine’s age has a significant, 
positive effect upon the probability of a stayer to reenlist.   
The Skill Family variables produced a wide range of marginal effects.  Models 3A 
and 4A reveal that Marines in all Skill Families are more likely to reenlist (than extend) 
than an infantry Marine.  When the model controls for SRB, Marines in field artillery, 
clerical, and food service occupations have the lowest marginal effects, and air traffic 
controllers, band members, and logistics personnel have the highest marginal effects (see 
Table 24).  However, when the model controls for the SRB multiple, Marines in field 
artillery, clerical, and general technical have the lowest marginal effects, and air traffic 
controllers, band members, and logistics Marines have the highest marginal effects (see 




2. Stayer-Only Basic Retention Models with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, 
FY00, FY01 Variables (Models 3B, 3C, 3D, 4B, 4C, 4D) 
Results of estimating the various specifications of models 3 and 4 are shown in 
Tables 26 through 31.  The marginal effects listed in Tables 26 through 31 show that a 
Marine offered a SRB is 2.2 to 4.2 percentage points more likely to reenlist (than extend) 
than one who is not offered a SRB.  Further, Tables 26 and 27 show that a one-level 
increase in the SRB multiple increases the relative probability of reenlisting versus 
extending by .5 to 1.8 percentage points.  While the variables SRB01 and MULT01 are 
significant in models 26 through 31, the effect of the lump sum bonus appears to change 
from positive to negative as controls for fiscal years are added to models 3D and 4D (see 
Tables 28 and 31).  Note that the marginal effects of SRB01 and MULT01 (in models 3D 
and 4D) are relatively small.  Therefore, a sign change is not too surprising.         
The coefficient on the military-to-civilian pay ratio is positive and statistically 
significant in Tables 26 through 31.  Tables 26 through 31 reveal that all things being 
equal, a 1-percent increase in the pay ratio is related to a .46 to .52-percent increase in the 
relative reenlistment rate.   
The effects of variables AFQTHIGH, ZZ_AGE, NOTWHITE, and MARDEP 
were consistent with models 3A and 4A.  Tables 26 through 31 show that a Marine who 
scores above the 50th percentile on the AFQT is 1.4 to 1.8 percentage points less likely to 
reenlist than extend.  A one-year increase in a Marine’s age has a significant, positive 
effect upon the probability to reenlist (versus extend).  The model indicated a significant, 
positive relationship between race and the propensity to reenlist.  Holding all other 
variables constant, a non-white Marine has a 2.9 to 3.2-percentage point higher relative 
probability of reenlisting versus extending.  Similarly, a Marine who is married and/or 
has dependents is 13.5 percentage-points more likely to reenlist (versus extend) than one 
who has neither a spouse nor children.   
The variable UNEMPLOY produced an unexpected sign.  Similar to models 1C, 
2C, 1D, and 2D, models listed in Tables 26 through 31 indicated a negative relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the propensity to reenlist.  The marginal effect of (-
.007) suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate from 4.15-percent to 5.15-
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percent would be associated with a very minor decrease in the average reenlistment rate.  
Note that this is a relatively negligible effect.     
A woman is 2.0 to 2.3 percentage points less likely to reenlist (than extend) than a 
man.  This result is unexpected, however it is consistent with all models that have been 
mentioned earlier.   
The Skill Family variables produced a wide range of marginal effects that varied 
significantly when the model controlled for relative pay and unemployment.  That is, 
while models 3A and 4A reveal that Marines in all of the Skill Families are more likely to 
reenlist than an infantry Marine, models 3B, 3C, 3D, 4B, 4C, and 4D reveal that only 
Marines in the Skill Family Food are less likely to reenlist (versus extend) than a Marine 
in the Skill Family Combat.  Tables 26 through 31 show that a Marine in the Skill Family 
Food is approximately 14.5 to 16.1 percentage points less likely to reenlist (versus 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
SRB .4846 .1380 .053*** 0.022
SRB00 .1584 X X X
SRB01 .1907 .1466   .060** 0.039
UNEMPLOY 4.154 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.423 .374*** 0.509
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.101   .043** -0.016
NOTWHITE .3332 .1755 .044*** 0.028
MARDEP .5102 .8430 .040*** 0.135
FEMALE .0632 -.1297   .081 -0.021
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0503 .010*** 0.008
ACM .0672 .7823 .094*** 0.125
BA .0069 .8800 .261*** 0.141
CL .1836 .1832   .073** 0.029
EL .1455 .8429 .071*** 0.135
FA .0443 .5877 .102*** 0.094
FOOD .0232 -.9179 .201*** -0.147
GT .0438 .7364 .108*** 0.118
LOG .0368 .1718   .127 0.027
MM .1214 .6124 .072*** 0.098
MP .0641 .4679 .088*** 0.075
MT .0894 .6982 .086*** 0.112
NAV .0103 2.029 .271*** 0.325
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -3.1633
ADJ R SQ. .0776
N 18157
CHI SQ 914.9***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlist to Stayers Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
SRB .4846 .1408 .053*** 0.023
SRB00 .1584 X X X
SRB01 .1907 .1357 .060*** 0.038
UNEMPLOY 4.154 -.0593   .023** -0.009
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.374 .374*** 0.502
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.099   .043** -0.016
NOTWHITE .3332 .1895 .044*** 0.030
MARDEP .5102 .8442 .040*** 0.135
FEMALE .0632 -.1310   .082 -0.021
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0505 .010*** 0.008
ACM .0672 .7803 .094*** 0.125
BA .0069 .8785 .261*** 0.141
CL .1836 .1822   .073** 0.029
EL .1455 .8378 .071*** 0.134
FA .0443 .5886 .102*** 0.094
FOOD .0232 -.9051 .201*** -0.145
GT .0438 .7308 .108*** 0.117
LOG .0368 .1766   .127 0.028
MM .1214 .6120 .072*** 0.098
MP .0641 .4681 .088*** 0.075
MT .0894 .6903 .086*** 0.110
NAV .0103 2.018 .271*** 0.323
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -2.8879
ADJ R SQ. .0782
N 18157
CHI SQ 921.6***
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
FY01 Reenlist to Stayers Rate
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
 




Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 -.0891   .048* -0.015
FY01 .3495 .4391 .067*** 0.060
SRB .4846 .2614 .055*** 0.042
SRB00 .1584 X X X
SRB01 .1907 -.3592 .086*** -0.013
UNEMPLOY 4.154 -.0422  .023* -0.007
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.454 .384*** 0.514
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.0900 .043** -0.014
NOTWHITE .3332 .1807 .044*** 0.029
MARDEP .5102 .8486 .040*** 0.136
FEMALE .0632 -.1456  .082* -0.023
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0509  .010** 0.008
ACM .0672 .7150  .095** 0.114
BA .0069 .8113  .262** 0.130
CL .1836 .1109  .074 0.018
EL .1455 .7648 .072*** 0.122
FA .0443 .6040 .102*** 0.097
FOOD .0232 -.9759 .204*** -0.156
GT .0438 .7103 .108*** 0.114
LOG .0368 .1504  .128 0.024
MM .1214 .5733 .073*** 0.092
MP .0641 .4480 .088*** 0.072
MT .0894 .6508 .087*** 0.104
NAV .0103 2.039 .272*** 0.326
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -3.0733
ADJ R SQ. .0838
N 18157
CHI SQ 989.5***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlist to Stayers Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 
Table 28.   Stayer Basic SRB Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01) for 
Stayers Only (Model 3D). 
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Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
MULT 1.004 .0753 .022*** 0.012
MULT00 .3553 X X X
MULT01 .3994 .0574   .026** 0.018
UNEMPLOY 4.154 X X X
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.463 .370*** 0.515
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.1145 .043*** -0.018
NOTWHITE .3332 .1837 .044*** 0.029
MARDEP .5102 .8424 .040*** 0.135
FEMALE .0632 -.1245   .082 -0.020
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0483 .010*** 0.008
ACM .0672 .6490 .100*** 0.104
BA .0069 .8136 .259*** 0.130
CL .1836 .1108   .067* 0.018
EL .1455 .7263 .074*** 0.116
FA .0443 .5479 .102*** 0.088
FOOD .0232 -1.009 .195*** -0.161
GT .0438 .5127 .121*** 0.082
LOG .0368 .1209   .126 0.019
MM .1214 .5634 .071*** 0.090
MP .0641 .4329 .087*** 0.069
MT .0894 .6265 .081*** 0.100
NAV .0103 1.860 .274*** 0.298
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -3.0718
ADJ R SQ. .0782
N 18157
CHI SQ 921.9***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlist to Stayer Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 
Table 29.   Stayer Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO) for Stayers Only (Model 4B). 
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Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 X X X
FY01 .3495 X X X
MULT 1.004 .0758 .022*** 0.012
MULT00 .3553 X X X
MULT01 .3994 .0535   .026** 0.018
UNEMPLOY 4.154 -.0589   .023** -0.009
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.409 .370*** 0.507
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.1116 .043*** -0.018
NOTWHITE .3332 .1974 .044*** 0.032
MARDEP .5102 .8437 .040*** 0.135
FEMALE .0632 -.1259   .082 -0.020
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0485 .010*** 0.008
ACM .0672 .6487 .100*** 0.104
BA .0069 .8126 .259*** 0.130
CL .1836 .1107   .067* 0.018
EL .1455 .7230 .074*** 0.116
FA .0443 .5487 .102*** 0.088
FOOD .0232 -.9936 .196*** -0.159
GT .0438 .5095 .121*** 0.082
LOG .0368 .1273   .126 0.020
MM .1214 .564 .071*** 0.090
MP .0641 .4335 .087*** 0.069
MT .0894 .6189 .081*** 0.099
NAV .0103 1.850 .274*** 0.296
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -2.7959
ADJ R SQ. .0788
N 18157
CHI SQ 928.5***
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
FY01 Reenlist to Stayer Rate
 
Table 30.   Stayer Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, and UNEMPLOY) for Stayers 
Only (Model 4C). 
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Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
FY00 .3314 -.1032   .048** -0.018
FY01 .3495 .3354 .058*** 0.046
MULT 1.004 .1226 .024*** 0.020
MULT00 .3553 X X X
MULT01 .3994 -.0889 .032*** 0.005
UNEMPLOY 4.154 -.0431   .023* -0.007
PAYRATIO b .7439 3.255 .381*** 0.484
AFQTHIGH .6707 -.1030   .044** -0.016
NOTWHITE .3332 .1871 .044*** 0.030
MARDEP .5102 .8491 .040*** 0.136
FEMALE .0632 -.1385   .082* -0.022
ZZ_AGE 22.787 .0497 .010*** 0.008
ACM .0672 .5997 .101*** 0.096
BA .0069 .8076 .259*** 0.129
CL .1836 .1030   .067 0.016
EL .1455 .6979 .074*** 0.112
FA .0443 .5390 .102*** 0.086
FOOD .0232 -.9240 .199*** -0.148
GT .0438 .4944 .121*** 0.079
LOG .0368 .1567   .127 0.025
MM .1214 .5568 .071*** 0.089
MP .0641 .4368 .087*** 0.070
MT .0894 .6173 .081*** 0.099
NAV .0103 1.861 .274*** 0.298
.835
FY00 Reenlist to Stayer Rate .779
CONSTANT -2.8373
ADJ R SQ. .0838
N 18157
CHI SQ 990***
      increase in basic pay. (Pay Elasticity).
      B*X*(1-P). P=Reenlistment Rate. X=Mean of PAYRATIO.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
(b) Marginal Effect for PAYRATIO measures the percent
      change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-percent   
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
FY01 Reenlist to Stayer Rate
*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
 
Table 31.   Stayer Basic MULT Model (with PAYRATIO, UNEMPLOY, FY00, FY01) for 
Stayers Only (Model 4D). 
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C. RETENTION MODELS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001 
(MODELS 5 AND 6) 
Data availability allowed for the estimation of models of enlisted Marine retention 
for a longer period, fiscal years 1996 through 2001.  This is done to determine whether 
results might be affected by the period selected for the control group.  The results of 
models 5 and 6 are shown in Tables 32 and 33.  The effect of the selective reenlistment 
bonus, compared to the results using the 1999-2001 data is markedly larger.  Table 32 
shows that a Marine offered a SRB during FY96-01 is 4.6 percentage points more likely 
to reenlist than one who is not offered a SRB.  Table 33 shows that a one-level increase 
in the SRB multiple increases the propensity of a Marine to reenlist by 2.6 percentage 
points.  The interaction coefficients for models 5 and 6 are positive.  Further, Table 32 
suggests that the impact of the lump sum bonus offered in FY01 appears to be larger than 
the partial installment bonus offered in FY96 (the impact of the SRB increased by 2.7 
percentage points between fiscal years 1996 and 2001).  The impact of a one-level 
increase in the SRB multiple increased by .5 percentage points between fiscal years 1996 
and 2001.   
The significance of variables AFQTHIGH and FEMALE are questionable.  Note 
that Tables 32 and 33 show that the marginal effect for AFQTHIGH and FEMALE are 
extremely small.  Tables 32 and 33 show that the results for variables ZZ_AGE, 
NOTWHITE, and MARDEP are consistent with expectations.  A one-year increase in a 
Marine’s age has a negligible effect upon the probability to reenlist.  The models 
indicated a relationship between race and the propensity to reenlist that was similar to 
models 1 and 2.  Holding all other variables constant, the fact that a Marine is not white is 
related to a 7.4 to 7.6-percentage point increase in his propensity to reenlist.  Similarly, a 
Marine who is married and/or has dependents is 10.5 percentage-points more likely to 
reenlist than one who has neither a spouse nor children.   
The variable BA produced the largest effect amongst the Skill Family variables.  
A Marine in the Skill Family Band is approximately 18 percentage points more likely to 
reenlist than the omitted base-case (Combat).  Similar to models 1 and 2, Tables 32 and 
33 show that Marines in the Skill Families NAV, ACM, GT, CL, and LOG are 5.5 to 
13.6 percentage points more likely to reenlist than infantry Marines.  However, a Marine 
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in the Skill Family Field Artillery is only 4.7 to 5.3 percentage points more likely to 
reenlist than an infantry Marine.  Table 33 shows that the marginal effect for all Skill 
Families are smaller than the marginal effects listed in Table 32.      
Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
SRB .3603 .2534 .084*** 0.046
SRB01 .0947 .1203    .026*** 0.073
AFQTHIGH .6874 .0255    .016 0.005
NOTWHITE .2550 .4113 .016*** 0.074
MARDEP .4612 .5851 .014*** 0.105
FEMALE .0462 -.0022    .032 0.000
ZZ_AGE 22.761 .0174 .004*** 0.003
ACM .0588 .6468 .034*** 0.116
BA .0055 1.029 .089*** 0.185
CL .1425 .7538 .026*** 0.136
EL .1403 .4610 .026*** 0.083
FA .0486 .2927 .038*** 0.053
FOOD .0246 .5022 .048*** 0.090
GT .0346 .5807 .041*** 0.104
LOG .0306 .6873 .041*** 0.124
MM .1245 .4306 .027*** 0.077
MP .0662 .3827 .033*** 0.069
MT .0971 .4034 .030*** 0.073
NAV .0088 .6576 .072*** 0.118
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
FY99 Reenlistment Rate .227
FY98 Reenlistment Rate .224
FY97 Reenlistment Rate .218
FY96 Reenlistment Rate .228
CONSTANT -2.5365




*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.  
Table 32.   Basic SRB Model: Fiscal Years 1996-2001 (Model 5). 
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Standard Marginal
Variable Mean β Error Effect a
MULT .7055 .1432 .008*** 0.026
MULT01 .1839 .0174    .011* 0.031
AFQTHIGH .6874 .0064    .016 0.001
NOTWHITE .2550 .4210 .016*** 0.076
MARDEP .4612 .5849 .014*** 0.105
FEMALE .0462 .0017    .032 0.000
ZZ_AGE 22.761 .0149 .004*** 0.003
ACM .0588 .5224 .035*** 0.094
BA .0055 .9773 .089*** 0.176
CL .1425 .6982 .025*** 0.126
EL .1403 .3307 .027*** 0.059
FA .0486 .2610 .037*** 0.047
FOOD .0246 .4360 .048*** 0.078
GT .0346 .3045 .045*** 0.055
LOG .0306 .6592 .041*** 0.119
MM .1245 .3991 .027*** 0.072
MP .0662 .3637 .033*** 0.065
MT .0971 .3455 .029*** 0.062
NAV .0088 .4657 .074*** 0.084
.265
FY00 Reenlistment Rate .248
FY99 Reenlistment Rate .227
FY98 Reenlistment Rate .224
FY97 Reenlistment Rate .218
FY96 Reenlistment Rate .228
CONSTANT -2.4113




*** Significant at .01 level of significance.
        change in the explanatory variable.  
        B*P*(1-P).  P=Reenlistment Rate. B=Coefficient.
**   Significant at .05 level of significance.
*     Significant at .10 level of significance.
(a)   Marginal Effect measures the percentage point 
        change in the reenlistment rate given a 1-unit 
 
Table 33.   Basic MULT Model: Fiscal Years 1996-2001 (Model 6). 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
Several findings emerged from this study of the effect of the United States Marine 
Corps’ Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRB) on reenlistment 
decisions of first-term enlisted Marines.  Major results of statistical analyses include the 
following: 
• The basic models using data for 1999-2001 revealed that retention rates 
increased as a result of changing the SRB payment method to lump sum. 
The relationship between SRBs and reenlistment rates was found to be 
positive and significant.  A Marine who is offered a SRB is 2.4 to 3.2 
percentage points more likely to reenlist than one who is not offered a 
SRB.  The basic models found that the impact of the lump sum bonus 
offered in FY01 appears to be larger than the partial installment bonus 
offered in FY00 and FY99.  A Marine offered a lump sum SRB is 5.8 
percentage points more likely to reenlist than a Marine offered a partial 
installment bonus in FY99-FY00.  Additionally, a one-multiple SRB 
increase during FY01 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2.6 
percentage points (compared to FY99-FY00).  Thus, the impact of the 
SRB increased by 2.6 percentage points between fiscal years 1999-2000 
and 2001.  Further, the impact of the lump sum bonus increased the ratio 
of reenlisters to total stayers by 1.5 to 3.0 percentage points between fiscal 
years 1999-2000 and 2001.       
• Models that used data for fiscal years 1996 through 2001 determined that 
the effect of the selective reenlistment bonus, compared to the results 
using the 1999-2001 data, is markedly larger. The relationship between 
SRBs and reenlistment rates was found to be positive and significant.  A 
Marine who is offered a SRB during FY96-FY01 is 4.6 percentage points 
more likely to reenlist than one who is not offered a SRB.  Model 5 (Table 
32) found that the impact of the lump sum bonus offered in FY01 appears 
to be larger than the partial installment bonus offered in FY96-FY00.  A 
Marine offered a lump sum SRB is 7.3 percentage points more likely to 
reenlist than a Marine offered a partial installment bonus in FY96-FY00.  
Additionally, a one-multiple SRB increase during FY01 is related to a 
reenlistment rate increase of 3.1 percentage points (compared to FY96-
FY00).  Thus, the impact of the SRB increased by 2.7 percentage points 
between fiscal years 1996-2000 and 2001.      
• Most MOSs have higher reenlistment probabilities relative to the Infantry 
MOS.  Specifically, when the model controls for relative pay, Marines in 
non-infantry occupations (with the exception of Marines in food service 
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and logistical specialties) are 7.1 to 33.9 percentage points more likely to 
reenlist.  That is, while Marines in aviation-related specialties have the 
highest probabilities of reenlistment, Marines in clerical and military 
police/explosives specialties have the lowest reenlistment rates relative to 
the Skill Family Combat.  Further, Marines in logistical and food service 
occupations are 2.3 and 28.9 percentage points less likely to reenlist than 
Marines in infantry-related occupations, respectively.    
• Higher military-to-civilian pay ratios are associated with higher 
reenlistment rates.  A 1-percentage point increase in relative pay results in 
a 2.8 percent increase in the reenlistment rate.   
• State-level unemployment rates had a negative effect on first-term 
reenlistment rates.  Specifically, a 1-percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate results in a negligible decrease in the reenlistment rate. 
• Women are 2 percentage points less likely to reenlist than are men. 
• Non-whites are 6.9 to 7.3 percentage points more likely to reenlist than 
leave active service, but non-white ‘stayers’ are 2.6 to 3.2 percentage 
points more likely to reenlist than extend. 
• While Marines who are married and/or have dependents are 10.2 
percentage points more likely to reenlist than leave active service, 
‘stayers’ with dependents are 13.4 to 13.6 percentage points more likely to 
reenlist than extend. 
• Marines who score above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test are approximately 1.0 to 1.7 percentage points less 
likely to reenlist than Marines who score below the 50th percentile on the 
AFQT. 
B. CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The primary research question of this thesis was to better understand the effect of 
the SRB lump sum payment method as an incentive to reenlist.  This research suggests 
that the relationship between the lump sum payment method and reenlistment rates is 
positive and significant.  This thesis supports Dave Ross' prediction, “that the effects of a 
SRB payment method change to lump sum will increase retention levels compared to the 
current SRB payment method.” [Ref 1:p 70]     
The basic models found that a Marine offered a lump sum SRB is 5.8 percentage 
points more likely to reenlist than a Marine offered an installment bonus during FY99-00.  
Thus, the impact of the SRB increased by 2.6 percentage points between fiscal year 1999-
2000 and fiscal year 2001.  This finding validates Ross’ estimate that the personal 
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discount rate (PDR) for first-term enlisted Marines is approximately .41.  The practical 
impact of this finding is noteworthy.  If a Marine’s personal discount rate is .41, he is 
indifferent between receiving a SRB of $20,000 paid over time in partial installments 
versus a lump sum payment of $15,230, a difference of $4,770 or 24 percent.  Thus, the 
estimate of a personal discount rate of .41 has the potential to increase reenlistment rates 
using the same amount of budgetary dollars, or to achieve the same reenlistment rate for a 
lower budgetary expenditure. [Ref 1: p. 6]  Future studies should note that there are 
differences in individual PDRs across various demographic groups.  Thus, it is difficult to 
pick a “single” PDR to analyze the behavior of Marines eligible for a Zone A 
reenlistment bonus.  [Ref 1:pp. 26-27]  However, the author believes that the PDR of .41 
offers the Marine Corps the opportunity to carefully consider reevaluating the dollar 
amount of SRB it pays to Zone A enlisted Marines. 
The lump sum bonus increased a Marine's relative probability of reenlisting 
versus extending by 1.5 to 3.0 percentage points between fiscal years 1999 and 2001.  A 
Marine offered a lump sum SRB is 5.5 percentage points more likely to reenlist than 
extend (compared to a Marine offered an installment bonus during FY99-00).  This 
finding is consistent with Hosek and Peterson’s research that found the added advantage 
of the lump sum bonus comes primarily from channeling stayers into long-term 
reenlistments.  Note that Table 10 pointed out a 5.3 percentage point increase in the 
reenlist to stayer rate between FY99 and FY01.      
As previously noted, the present study evaluated first-term reenlistment data 
captured during the first year of the lump sum payment method.  A one-level increase in 
the SRB multiple during FY01 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2.6 percentage 
points (compared to FY99-00).  This finding is consistent with the prior research on the 
impact of the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions completed by Warner and 
Goldberg (1982).  However, the significance of the lump sum SRB appears to vary as 
controls for pay, unemployment, and fiscal years are added to the models.  Perhaps the 
mixing of pay and bonus variables in the specification may bias the effect of the bonus.  
Future studies could use a single relative pay measure to proxy compensation.  Future 
regression studies should include more years of data that could provide greater variability 
in the effect of the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions.  Further, future studies 
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could use the other branches of the armed forces that are not offering the lump sum bonus 
as part of the control group.  Additionally, proxy variables for quality-of-life, and 
deployment time could be included. 
 
Model FY
0 1 2 3 4 5
99-00 .223 .241 .260 .280 .301 .322




Table 34.   Predicted Reenlistment Rates by Multiple (Based on Logit Model 2A). 
 
Table 34 shows the predicted reenlistment rates by SRB multiple based on logit 
model 2A.  The results displayed in Table 34 suggest that higher SRB multiples are 
associated to higher reenlistment rates.  Further, the results displayed in Table 34 suggest 
that the lump sum payment method is associated with a marked increase in long-term 
reenlistment commitments by Marines not offered a bonus (compared to FY99-00), and 
an overall increase in the predicted reenlistment rates of Marines at all multiple levels 
(compared to FY99-00).   
Marines in the Skill Families LOG and FOOD were 2.0 percentage points and 
29.3 percentage points less likely to reenlist than Marines in the Skill Family CO, 
respectively.  Perhaps this is due to the food service occupational specialty being 
downsized during fiscal year 1999, or to the fact that Marines in the Skill Family Food 
were not offered a SRB multiple during FY99-FY01.  Earning opportunities in 
comparable civilian occupations for Marines in logistics and food-related specialties are 
the lowest of the Skill Families.  Therefore, it is counterintuitive to suggest that 
employment opportunities and pay for logistics and food-service Marines facing the first-
term reenlistment decision were competitive in the private sector during fiscal years 
1999-2001.  Perhaps the relatively low reenlistment rate for Marines in food and 
logistics-related specialties is related to their operational tempo.  Furthermore, as 
previously noted in Chapter IV, some Marines have suggested that the offer of a lump 
sum bonus to certain Marines may have a negative impact upon reenlistment.  Future 
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studies could explore this speculation and the relationship between operational tempo, 
quality-of-life, and retention by individual occupational specialties.    
Previous studies have found significant, positive effects of relative pay on 
reenlistment rates. [Quester and Adedeji, 1991; Hosek and Peterson, 1985; and North, 
1994]  The calculated elasticity from the logit model is similar to that of Quester and 
Adedeji.  Mehay points out “if SRB managers identify shortages in specific 
(occupations), they need (occupation)-specific pay effects to determine the bonus 
increase that will eliminate the shortage in each specific (occupation).” [Ref 27:p. 15]  
Future studies should calculate occupation-specific pay elasticities and consider how 
Department of Defense analysts could use the various pay elasticities to: 1) optimally 
target specific occupations with retention bonuses, and/or 2) create occupation-specific 
pay tables.  Perhaps future studies could explore replacing retention bonuses with 
occupation-specific pay tables.  Analysts argue that until the Department of Defense 
creates occupation-specific pay tables, the SRB program will be a necessary tool to 
maintain an adequate level of experienced and qualified enlisted personnel in the 
peacetime forces of the uniformed services. [Ref 39]       
Two of the results in the present study differ from that of previous research.  First, 
previous studies have found significant, positive effects of unemployment on retention.  
Secondly, women Marines are less likely to reenlist than are men.  Most researchers 
would agree that unemployment rates at the time of reenlistment are a likely influence on 
decisions to reenlist. [Warner and Goldberg, 1982; Quester and Adedeji, 1991]  The 
present study used home-of-record (state-specific) unemployment data that are tied to the 
year of a Marine’s reenlistment decision.  A more accurate determinant of retention may 
be unemployment rates at a Marine’s current duty station.  Since Marines socialize with 
civilian peers in the community surrounding their duty station, perhaps the 
unemployment rate in the region their duty station is located may be a more accurate 
determinant of retention.  Home-of-record or national level unemployment rates may be 
accurate determinants for Marines stationed overseas. 
One explanation for the unexpected result regarding women Marines may be the 
small number of women in the sample.  Additionally, Chapter V pointed out that the 
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significant increase in reenlistment rates for Marines not offered a bonus (in the all-male 
Skill Families of Combat and Field Artillery) might have caused problems for the 
estimate of female reenlistment rates.  A more anecdotal explanation may be related to 
pre-enlistment attitudes.  According to the Youth Attitude Tracking Study in 1992, 
women have a much lower propensity to enlist than do men. [Ref 40:p. 69]  Perhaps, 
women who enter the Marine Corps are less confident of their decision to join the Marine 
Corps, and therefore less likely to remain at the end of their current contract.  A 
preliminary analysis of the 1999 Marine Corps Web-Based Exit Survey revealed two 
unique factors that impacted women Marines’ decisions to leave the Marine Corps--“unit 
morale” and the “impact of career on my kids.” [Ref 41:p. 17]  Future longitudinal 
research could confirm the current relationship between women Marines and the 
propensity to reenlist. 
As previously noted, the present study discovered significant, positive effects of 
race and marital status on the propensity to reenlist.  These results are consistent with 
previous research.  It is clear that the results do not suggest a reason for the significant, 
positive effects of these factors.  Why, precisely, do these Marines have a greater 
propensity to reenlist than leave active service?  Furthermore, why, are non-white 
Marines relatively less prone to reenlist when faced with the choice to reenlist or extend 
(compared to when they are faced with the choice to reenlist or leave)?  According to a 
preliminary analysis of the 1999 Marine Corps Retention Survey, Marines with family 
obligations place great importance on current pay, medical and retirement benefits, and 
advancement opportunities. [Ref 42:p. 21]  Similarly, the 1999 USMC Exit Survey 
suggests that non-white Marines’ retention behavior is sensitive to changes in “incentive 
pay,” “career advancement and development,” “immediate seniors’ leadership 
characteristics,” and “current duty location.”  Further, approximately half of the 
respondents who left the Marine Corps rated racial discrimination as “not important” to 
their decision to leave. [Ref 41:p. 17]  Perhaps, while the opportunity offered by the 
Marine Corps for an individual to be evaluated as a Marine and not as a “racial minority” 
motivates non-white Marines to reenlist (when offered the choice of reenlist or leave), 
there is an intangible measure of uncertainty with their place in the Marine Corps 
combined with greater opportunities in the private sector that offer the luxury of 
81 
indecision when faced with making a long-term reenlistment commitment.  Future studies 
could augment the results of this thesis by discovering the reasons contributing to a non-
white Marine’s decision to enlist, reenlist, and extend.  Similarly, the true reasons why a 
Marine with marital and/or parenting obligations reenlisted should be captured.  One way 
to capture the true reason why an individual reenlists (and/or extends) is to conduct a 
personal interview immediately prior to their reenlistment date.             
As noted in Chapter I, the Marine Corps initiated the Subsequent Term Alignment 
Plan (STAP) in October 2001.  According to this new policy, career force Marines are 
offered the lump sum SRB.  At the time of this writing (November 2001) the Marine 
Corps had reenlisted approximately 10 percent of the STAP reenlistment target.  At the 
same time, 59 percent of the First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP) reenlistment target had 
been attained.  In order to support STAP with SRB dollars, the dollar amount of bonuses 
offered to Zone A eligible Marines was decreased from fiscal year 2001 levels.  Future 
studies should answer the following questions for Marines facing reenlistment decisions 
in Zone A, B, and C: 
• What was the change in career force retention levels as a result of 
implementing STAP? 
• What is the impact of personal characteristics on reenlistment decisions? 
• What is the impact of civilian pay and unemployment on reenlistment 
decisions? 
• What is the impact of the SRB multiple being offered under the 
installment and lump sum payment methods? 
• What are the optimal funding requirements for FTAP and STAP? 
• What is the impact of STAP on FTAP reenlistment targets? 
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APPENDIX A.  STATE-SPECIFIC UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: 
FISCAL YEARS 1999 THROUGH 2001 
STATE FY 99 FY 00 FY 01
Alabama 4.6 4.7 4.7
Alaska 6.1 6.8 6.6
Arizona 4.4 4.0 3.7
Arkansas 4.7 4.5 4.3
California 5.4 5 4.8
Colorado 3.1 2.8 2.6
Connecticut 3.2 2.6 2.0
Delaware 3.5 4.0 3.7
Wash DC 6.9 5.7 5.7
Florida 4.0 3.6 3.6
Georgia 4.0 3.9 3.4
Hawaii 5.9 4.6 4.2
Idaho 5.2 4.9 5.1
Illinois 4.3 4.3 4.9
Indiana 3.0 3.4 3.0
Iowa 2.6 2.6 2.8
Kansas 3.1 3.6 3.7
Kentucky 4.5 4.2 4.2
Louisiana 5.2 5.3 5.6
Maine 4.1 3.8 3.2
Maryland 3.7 3.8 3.7
Massachusetts 3.2 2.8 2.7
Michigan 3.9 3.5 4.3
Minnesota 2.7 3.2 3.4
Mississippi 5.0 5.7 4.9
Missouri 3.5 3.4 3.7
Montana 5.1 5.0 5.0
Nebraska 2.8 2.9 2.9
Nevada 4.4 4.1 4.4
New Hampshire 2.7 2.9 2.5
New Jersey 4.7 3.9 3.8
New Mexico 5.9 4.8 5.2
New York 5.3 4.7 4.4
North Carolina 3.1 3.5 4.2
North Dakota 3.5 3.1 2.6
Ohio 4.3 4.2 2.3
Oklahoma 3.8 3.1 2.9
Oregon 5.8 5.1 4.9
Pennsylvania 4.5 4.2 4.4
Rhode Island 4.2 4.2 3.9
South Carolina 4.4 4.2 3.6
South Dakota 3.0 2.4 2.4
Tennessee 4.1 3.9 4.2
Texas 4.7 4.4 3.8
Utah 3.9 3.3 3.3
Vermont 3.1 3.0 3.0
Virginia 2.8 2.3 2.2
Washington 4.8 5.1 5.5
West Virginia 6.7 5.7 5.6
Wisconsin 3.1 3.5 3.9
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APPENDIX B.  MILITARY BASE PAY: 1995 THROUGH 2001 
Rank Years of Service 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
PVT (E1) 1 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PVT (E1) 2 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PVT (E1) 3 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PVT (E1) 4 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PVT (E1) 5 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PVT (E1) 6 10,253$      9,709$        10,812$      11,112$      11,513$      12,067$      12,514$      
PFC (E2) 1 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
PFC (E2) 2 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
PFC (E2) 3 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
PFC (E2) 4 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
PFC (E2) 5 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
PFC (E2) 6 11,491$      11,768$      12,120$      12,456$      12,910$      13,529$      14,029$      
LCPL (E3) 1 11,941$      12,229$      12,600$      12,498$      13,414$      14,058$      14,576$      
LCPL (E3) 2 12,596$      12,899$      13,284$      13,656$      14,148$      14,828$      15,685$      
LCPL (E3) 3 13,097$      13,410$      13,812$      14,196$      14,710$      15,415$      16,603$      
LCPL (E3) 4 13,615$      13,943$      14,364$      14,760$      15,296$      16,031$      16,625$      
LCPL (E3) 5 13,615$      13,943$      14,364$      14,760$      15,296$      16,031$      16,625$      
LCPL (E3) 6 13,615$      13,943$      14,364$      14,760$      15,296$      16,031$      16,625$      
CPL (E4) 1 12,672$      12,974$      13,368$      13,740$      14,231$      14,915$      15,466$      
CPL (E4) 2 13,385$      13,705$      14,112$      14,508$      15,034$      15,754$      17,086$      
CPL (E4) 3 14,173$      14,512$      14,952$      15,360$      15,919$      16,682$      18,007$      
CPL (E4) 4 15,264$      15,631$      16,104$      16,548$      17,143$      17,968$      18,914$      
CPL (E4) 5 15,264$      15,631$      16,104$      16,548$      17,143$      17,968$      18,914$      
CPL (E4) 6 15,869$      16,250$      16,740$      17,208$      17,824$      18,680$      19,836$      
SGT (E5) 1 13,586$      13,914$      14,328$      14,736$      15,260$      15,991$      16,582$      
SGT (E5) 2 14,789$      15,145$      15,600$      16,032$      16,610$      17,406$      18,590$      
SGT (E5) 3 15,509$      15,880$      16,356$      16,812$      17,417$      18,252$      19,487$      
SGT (E5) 4 16,182$      16,571$      17,064$      17,544$      18,176$      19,044$      20,412$      
SGT (E5) 5 16,182$      16,571$      17,064$      17,544$      18,176$      19,044$      20,412$      
SGT (E5) 6 17,248$      17,662$      18,192$      18,696$      19,372$      20,300$      21,334$      
  1 December 1995 would reach his first reenlistment decision point during FY 1996.  In this case 1995 military pay data
  would be used as the numerator ($14,173.20).
Military Base Pay Effective 1 October of each Year **
**Military base pay effective 1 October for each year was used as the numerator in the Military-to-Civilian Pay Ratio 
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APPENDIX C.  SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS MULTIPLES 
AND PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES BY 
SKILL FAMILY 
SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Aircraft Aircraft
Maintenance 6000 0 0 0 Maintenance 6082 0 0 0
(ACM) 6011 0 0 0 (ACM) 6083 3 5 0
6012 0 0 0 6084 0 0 0
6013 4 5 0 6085 3 5 0
6014 4 4 0 6086 3 5 0
6015 1 3 0 6087 2 4 0
6016 2 4 0 6088 0 0 0
6017 1 3 0 6091 0 0 0
6018 0 0 0 6092 3 4 3
6019 0 0 0 6093 0 0 0
6022 4 5 0 6094 3 4 0
6023 0 0 0 6098 0 0 0
6025 3 5 0 6111 0 0 0
6026 4 4 0 6112 1 3 4
6027 3 5 0 6113 1 2 3
6030 5 5 0 6114 3 3 2
6031 5 5 0 6115 0 0 0
6032 5 5 0 6116 0 0 0
6033 0 0 0 6119 0 0 0
6035 2 5 0 6122 2 5 2
6042 1 2 2 6123 3 1 1
6051 0 0 0 6124 4 4 3
6052 0 0 0 6132 3 4 3
6053 4 3 0 6135 0 5 0
6054 0 0 0 6143 0 0 0
6055 2 5 0 6151 0 0 0
6056 3 4 0 6152 5 5 4
6057 3 5 0 6153 2 4 3
6058 0 0 0 6154 2 3 3
6060 2 5 0 6155 0 0 0
6062 0 0 4 6156 0 0 4
6071 0 0 0 6172 4 5 4
6072 1 2 3 6173 3 4 5
6073 1 2 2 6174 4 5 4
6074 0 0 3 6175 0 0 0
6075 4 2 0 6176 0 0 4
6081 0 0 0  
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SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Band (BA) Clerical (CL)
5500 0 0 0 0000 0 0 0
5519 0 0 0 0100 0 0 0
5521 0 0 0 0121 0 0 0
5523 0 0 0 0131 0 0 0
5526 0 0 0 0151 0 0 0
5528 0 0 0 0193 0 0 0
5534 0 0 0 0500 0 0 0
5536 0 0 0 0511 0 5 4
5537 0 0 0 2542 0 0 0
5541 0 0 0 2549 0 0 0
5543 0 0 0 3000 0 0 0
5544 0 0 0 3043 0 0 0
5546 0 0 0 3044 0 0 0
5547 0 0 0 3051 0 0 0
5548 0 0 0 3052 0 1 0
5563 0 0 0 3100 0 0 0
5565 0 0 0 3112 0 0 0
5566 0 0 0 3400 0 0 0
9811 0 0 0 3421 0 0 0
9812 0 0 0 3431 0 0 0
3432 1 0 1
4400 0 0 0
Combat (CO) 4100 0 0 0
0300 0 0 0 4133 0 0 0
0311 1 1 1 4421 0 0 0
0321 3 0 3 4429 0 0 0
0331 0 0 1 4600 0 0 0
0341 0 0 1 4611 0 0 1
0351 0 0 1 4612 0 0 0
0369 0 0 0 4615 0 0 0
4621 0 0 0
4641 0 0 0
4653 0 0 0
4671 0 0 0
4691 0 0 0
6046 2 2 3
6047 2 2 0
6048 0 0 3






SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Electronics Electronics
Repair (EL) 1100 0 0 0 Repair (EL) 2887 4 5 5
1141 1 1 0 2889 0 0 0
1142 1 1 0 2891 0 0 0
1143 0 0 0 5900 0 0 0
2500 0 0 0 5914 0 0 0
2512 1 1 0 5915 0 0 0
2513 0 0 0 5918 0 0 0
2514 0 2 0 5924 0 0 0
2515 0 0 0 5925 0 0 0
2519 0 0 0 5928 0 0 0
2531 0 1 0 5937 3 5 4
2532 0 0 0 5939 3 0 4
2534 0 0 0 5942 1 3 2
2535 5 0 0 5944 0 0 0
2536 0 0 0 5947 0 0 0
2537 0 0 0 5948 1 0 2
2538 0 5 0 5952 3 5 4
2591 0 0 0 5953 3 5 4
2800 0 0 0 5954 2 3 4
2811 5 5 4 5959 0 0 0
2813 5 0 0 5962 5 5 4
2818 4 5 5 5963 2 3 3
2821 0 5 5 5964 0 0 0
2822 5 5 5 5974 5 5 4
2823 0 5 5 5978 0 0 0
2826 0 0 0 5979 2 3 3
2831 5 5 5 5993 0 0 0
2832 0 5 5 5994 0 0 0
2834 0 0 0 6211 0 0 0
2841 4 5 5 6212 0 0 2
2861 0 5 5 6213 0 0 4
2871 5 5 5 6214 0 0 4
2874 0 0 5 6216 0 0 3
2881 2 2 4 6217 0 0 3
2884 0 0 0 6222 0 0 4
2885 3 0 0 6223 0 0 4







SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Electronics Electronics
Repair (EL) 6226 0 0 3 Repair (EL) 6355 0 0 0
6227 0 0 5 6386 4 5 4
6232 0 0 5 6391 0 0 0
6241 0 0 0 6411 0 0 0
6242 0 0 0 6412 2 4 4
6251 0 0 0 6413 2 4 4
6252 0 0 3 6414 0 0 0
6253 0 0 3 6423 1 2 2
6256 0 0 3 6431 0 0 0
6257 0 0 4 6432 1 2 2
6282 0 0 2 6433 1 1 2
6283 0 0 5 6434 0 0 0
6286 0 0 2 6461 0 0 0
6287 0 0 3 6462 2 2 2
6300 0 0 0 6463 1 4 5
6311 0 0 0 6464 0 3 3
6312 0 0 4 6465 0 1 1
6313 3 3 3 6466 3 5 5
6314 3 2 3 6467 4 0 1
6315 3 3 0 6468 1 1 2
6316 4 2 4 6469 0 0 0
6317 4 5 4 6482 4 3 2
6318 0 0 0 6483 1 1 2
6322 3 4 4 6484 2 1 2
6323 2 4 4 6485 0 0 0
6324 3 4 4 6486 0 0 0
6325 0 0 0 6491 0 0 0
6326 0 0 0 6492 1 4 3
6331 0 0 0 6493 1 2 3
6332 0 0 3 6494 3 4 2
6333 2 3 4
6335 1 1 0
6336 1 1 2
6337 2 3 4
6353 0 0 0







SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Field General
Artillery 0800 0 0 0 Technical 0200 0 0 0
(FA) 0811 0 0 1 (GT) 0211 0 4 5
0842 1 4 3 0231 5 5 4
0844 1 4 4 0241 0 4 5
0847 2 1 1 0251 5 4 5
0848 0 0 0 0261 5 2 2
0861 1 1 1 0291 0 0 0
1800 0 0 0 0600 0 0 0
1811 0 0 0 0612 0 0 1
1812 0 1 1 0613 0 0 0
1833 0 1 1 0614 0 0 2
7200 0 0 0 0619 0 0 0
7212 3 3 3 0621 0 0 1
0622 0 0 1
Food 0624 0 0 1
Service 3300 0 0 0 0626 0 0 5
(FOOD) 3361 0 0 0 0627 0 0 3
3381 0 0 0 0629 0 0 0
0691 0 0 0
Mechanical 1521 0 0 0
Maintenance 0161 0 0 0 1541 0 0 0
(MM) 1161 0 1 1 2600 0 0 0
1169 0 0 0 2621 2 4 3
1171 0 1 0 2629 0 0 0
1181 0 1 0 2631 2 2 3
1300 0 0 0 2651 1 3 3
1316 0 0 0 2671 4 5 4
1341 0 0 0 2673 4 5 4
1345 0 0 0 2674 3 4 4
1349 0 0 0 2675 5 0 0
1361 0 0 0 2676 0 5 4
1371 0 0 0 2691 0 0 0
1391 0 0 0 3441 0 0 0
2100 0 0 0 3451 0 3 1
2111 0 0 1 4000 0 0 0
2131 1 0 2 4034 0 0 0
2141 1 1 1 4066 4 5 5
2145 0 0 0 4067 4 5 5
2146 1 1 1 4069 0 0 0
2147 1 0 1 4099 0 0 0
2149 0 0 0 4300 0 0 0
2161 0 2 1 4341 5 5 4
2171 2 2 2 6800 0 0 0
2181 0 0 0 6821 2 4 5
6500 0 0 0 6822 0 0 0
6511 0 0 0 6842 2 4 5
6521 0 0 0 7381 0 0 0
6531 1 2 2 7382 5 5 4
6541 1 1 3 8412 0 0 0
6591 0 0 0 9917 0 0 0
7000 0 0 0 9919 5 0 0
7011 0 0 2 9956 0 0 0
7051 1 1 2  
92 
SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01 SKILL FAMILY PMOS FY99 FY00 FY01
Logistics Motor
(LOG) 0400 0 0 0 Transport 3500 0 0 0
0411 1 2 1 (MT) 3513 0 0 0
0431 1 2 1 3521 0 0 0
0451 0 2 2 3522 0 0 0
0481 0 1 2 3523 0 0 0
0491 0 0 0 3524 0 0 0
6600 0 0 0 3529 0 0 0
6672 0 0 0 3531 0 0 0
6673 0 4 2 3533 0 0 0
3535 0 0 0
MP/NBC/ 3537 0 0 0
EOD/Ammo 0313 1 0 1
(MP) 0352 0 0 1 Navigator/
2300 0 0 0 ATC 7222 0 0 0
2311 1 1 1 (NAV) 7234 2 5 4
2336 0 0 1 7236 2 5 4
2351 1 0 0 7242 2 2 3
5700 0 0 0 7251 0 0 0
5711 2 2 2 7252 4 0 0
5800 0 0 0 7253 4 0 0
5811 0 0 0 7254 0 0 0
5815 0 0 0 7257 0 5 4
5821 0 0 1 7291 0 0 4
5831 1 1 2 7300 0 0 0
8111 0 0 0 7311 0 0 0
8531 0 0 0 7312 0 0 0
8532 0 0 0 7314 5 5 4
8551 0 0 0 7371 0 0 0
8641 0 0 0 7372 5 5 4
9900 0 0 0
9971 0 0 0
9972 0 0 0  
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